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Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth
Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee
Constitutional claims of incompetent counsel arise when a
criminal defendant attacks his conviction on the ground that it was
obtained at a trial at which he was represented by incompetent
counsel.' The courts disagree over both the source and the scope of
any constitutional requirement that counsel be competent. Most
courts find a right to competent counsel in the sixth amendment,
but require the defendant who seeks to establish a violation of that
right to show both that counsel was incompetent and that, but for
counsel's incompetence, the defendant might have been acquitted.
Other courts that rely on the sixth amendment only require the
defendant to show that counsel was incompetent in order to obtain
a new trial. Still other courts find no right to competent counsel in
the sixth amendment at all. These courts view questions of counsel
incompetence as a form of attack on a verdict under the fair trial
guarantee of the due process clause. Accordingly, these courts re-
quire the defendant to show that counsel's alleged incompetence
denied the defendant a fair trial.2
This comment will argue that the history and subsequent Su-
preme Court interpretation of the sixth amendment do not support
any sixth amendment right to competent counsel other than a
right to the appointment of counsel who appears, at the time of
appointment, to be capable of mounting a competent defense
(counsel who appears competent "ex ante"). Any attempt to read
I This comment focuses on pre-trial and trial representation, and does not address di-
rectly attacks on counsel's competence in sentencing proceedings following a valid convic-
tion. However, the comment's general approach, particularly its emphasis on due process
rather than the sixth amendment, is as applicable to claims relating to sentencing as to
those relating to the determination of guilt. Formulation of the precise standard of review
required by due process for counsel's competence in the sentencing phase is beyond the
scope of this comment.
2 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of incompetent counsel
claims, although it has had numerous opportunities to do so. See, e.g., Maryland v. Mar-
zullo, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) and cases cited
therein. At this writing, the Court has before it two cases presenting the issue of appropriate
constitutional standards for judicial review of incompetent counsel claims. See Washington
v. Strickland, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983), granting cert. to 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc); United States v. Cronic, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983), granting cert. to 675 F.2d 1126 (10th
Cir. 1982).
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into the sixth amendment a substantive right to counsel who, in
fact, provides the defendant with a competent defense is, at best, a
poor proxy for the defendant's substantive right to a verdict that is
reliable beyond a reasonable doubt. At worst, such a reading im-
properly constitutionalizes and hence federalizes every possible er-
ror at trial. The comment contends that a defendant is indeed en-
titled to representation that does not cast doubt on the reliability
of the verdict, but that the right to such representation is found
not in the sixth amendment but in the fair trial guarantee of the
due process clause. Finally, the comment analyzes the effect on the
availability of post-conviction remedies of its proposed bifurcation
of the right to competent counsel into a right to the appointment
of counsel who appears competent ex ante and a right to a reliable
verdict. It concludes that the proposal will neither curtail nor sub-
stantially expand the availability of such remedies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, criminal defendants have increasingly resorted
to incompetent-counsel claims as a means of raising a variety of
objections to their convictions. Any such objection may be trans-
formed into an incompetent counsel claim by alleging that counsel
was remiss in allowing the source of the underlying claim to arise.'
The treatment of incompetent counsel claims varies dramatically
from one jurisdiction to another. As the following example demon-
strates, there is much at stake in the resolution of these conflicting
standards.
Imagine two defendants convicted in different states. The
first, convicted by overwhelming evidence, wishes to attack his
conviction by raising a non-constitutional claim, for example, that
a prosecution witness was allowed to offer hearsay testimony.4 The
defendant's lawyer objects unsuccessfully to this testimony at trial.
On appeal, the state court finds error but concludes that, in view of
the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the error was
not sufficiently prejudicial to merit a new trial.5 The state collat-
eral-attack court declines review because state law bars collateral
3 See Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The
Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 56-61 (1978) (noting that limits on
habeas review may be bypassed by raising incompetent counsel claims).
4 See, e.g., Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981).
5 Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20, 23 & n.7 (1967) (discussing state law harm-
less-error provision).
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attack on issues that have been or could have been decided on
appeal.'
The second defendant, convicted on a far weaker case, wishes
to attack his conviction by raising a constitutional claim, for exam-
ple, that the state introduced the recorded testimony of an absent
witness into evidence without making a good faith effort to pro-
duce that witness.7 There is a strong possibility that the witness
would have testified differently had he been produced. Though he
objected to this evidence at trial, the defendant's lawyer fails to
raise this constitutional claim on appeal, and again the state collat-
eral-attack court refuses a hearing on the ground that claims that
could have been raised on appeal may not be raised on collateral
attack.
Both defendants petition a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus. In order to obtain habeas review, each defendant trans-
forms his underlying claim into an incompetent counsel claim.8
The first defendant alleges that his counsel incompetently failed to
interview the offending prosecution witness, thereby failing to dis-
cover the damaging hearsay subsequently offered at trial, and in-
competently failed to adduce the proper arguments in attacking
the witness's testimony as hearsay at trial or on appeal. The sec-
ond defendant alleges that his counsel incompetently assessed the
strength of his confrontation clause claim and incompetently failed
to pursue that claim on appeal.
6 A number of states follow this rule. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 5-6,
10-11 (1981).
1 See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
8 See supra text accompanying note 3. Before seeking relief in the federal courts, both
defendants are required to exhaust their state remedies by presenting their incompetent
counsel claims to the state collateral-attack court. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80-81
(1977). It is therefore assumed that the state court dismissed the petitions, applying one of
the approaches discussed below. See infra notes 27-34, 83-90, 122-37 and accompanying
text. In many state courts, collateral review may be barred by counsel's procedural default.
Some state courts, however, will forgive a procedural default where the default is found to
be a product of counsel's incompetence. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 676, 399
A.2d 256, 262 (1979).
On habeas review, the first defendant can raise only his incompetent counsel claim; his
underlying claim is non-constitutional and therefore not cognizable on federal habeas re-
view. Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1975). The second defendant's underlying consti-
tutional claim is barred by his procedural default on appeal unless he can show both cause
for the default and actual prejudice attributable to the underlying claim. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The "cause and prejudice" requirement might not bar either
defendant from raising an incompetent counsel claim because counsel's failure to attack his
own incompetence is sometimes held not to constitute a procedural default. Compare, e.g.,
Snyder v. State, 262 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1978) (default) with, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hare,
486 Pa. 123, 404 A.2d 388 (1979) (no default).
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The federal habeas court to which the first defendant applies
for relief construes the sixth amendment to guarantee competent
counsel.9 The court defines competence as the fulfillment of spe-
cific duties of counsel, here the duties to interview available wit-
nesses and research the applicable law.10 The court holds an evi-
dentiary hearing and concludes that counsel breached his duty to
interview the witness and to develop the legal argument that would
have established at trial that the damaging testimony was inadmis-
sible.11 Accordingly, the court grants the writ without inquiring
into the effect of this breach on the reliability of defendant's
conviction.
The second federal habeas court requires the defendant seek-
ing relief on an incompetent counsel claim to show not only that
counsel was incompetent, but also that this incompetence was
likely to have affected the outcome of his trial.12 Emphasizing that
counsel's actions are not to be judged in hindsight,13 the court ex-
amines the trial record and finds that counsel presented a vigorous
defense that revealed most of the weaknesses in the prosecution's
case,14 and determines that counsel's decision to pursue the defen-
dant's other claims on appeal was reasonable given what counsel
knew at the time.15 Accordingly, the court determines that counsel
was competent, and denies the writ without reaching the issue of
I E.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970). See infra notes 35-69
and accompanying text for discussion of the validity of construing the sixth amendment to
guarantee competent counsel.
'0 E.g., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
See infra notes 83-120 and accompanying text for an evaluation of this approach.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 279 & n.82 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Morrow v. Parratt, 574 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978).
12 E.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206-08 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331-33 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
974 (1979). This view of the right to competent counsel is discussed infra notes 27-82 and
accompanying text.
Some courts that adopt this approach recognize that counsel may owe various specific
duties to the defendant. These courts view such duties as matters of professional responsi-
bility, however, and not as violations of the sixth amendment. Breach of a duty is admissible
merely as evidence on the issue of overall competence. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d at 209.
IS See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328-30 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
974 (1979).
1 For an example of this reasoning, see Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 357-58
& n.3 (8th Cir. 1975).
15 Cf. Hatkins v. Wyrick, 552 F.2d 1308, 1313 (8th Cir. 1977) (failure to raise claim that
defendant was incompetent to stand trial not ineffective assistance where defense counsel
had no knowledge of defendant's mental condition prior to trial).
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actual prejudice."'
The disparity in the treatment of these two defendants is star-
tling. 7 The first defendant is able to obtain a new trial without
calling his legal guilt into question, and without asserting any vio-
lation of an underlying constitutional right. The second defendant
is denied relief despite the presence of constitutional error possibly
impeaching the reliability of his conviction.
Since almost every conceivable underlying claim can be con-
verted into an incompetent counsel claim,' the choice of standards
for reviewing incompetent counsel claims significantly affects the
system of state and federal postconviction remedies, 9 the enforce-
ment of state procedural rules,20 and the substantive content of the
constitutional rights of defendants generally.2' The current treat-
ment of incompetent counsel claims in the courts raises several im-
16 This approach was outlined in Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250-58 (5th
Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
17 Although the first defendant's success is less common than the second defendant's
failure because the legal doctrines that enabled the first defendant to obtain relief are em-
ployed by only a small minority of courts, such success is by no means unheard of. See infra
notes 83-90 and accompanying text. At the state court level, even greater disparities are
evident in the standards of review of incompetent counsel claims. See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4TH
27, 109-57 (1980). Moreover, some state courts maintain standards that differ from those
used by the federal courts in that state. See id. at 61-62; Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1060-64 (1977). The need for
uniformity in treating incompetent counsel claims thus implicates not only the rights of
defendants, but also the relations between state and federal courts.
18 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
'9 The generous reading given the sixth amendment by the federal court hearing the
petition of the first defendant in the example allows an underlying, non-constitutional claim
to be converted into a constitutional one. This expedient permits that defendant to obtain
federal habeas relief without the showing of prejudice the state court would require before
granting relief on the underlying, non-constitutional claim.
10 A slightly modified version of the first example demonstrates such an effect. If the
first defendant's non-constitutional claim had not been raised at trial, state procedural rules
would have deemed it waived and would therefore have barred it on appeal or collateral
attack. The first federal court's approach to incompetent counsel claims would nonetheless
permit the defendant to raise such a defaulted claim as an incompetent counsel claim,
thereby avoiding the state procedural default rule even as to a wholly state law claim. See
infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
21 The treatment of the second defendant illustrates the problems caused by a defini-
tion of competence that turns on a lawyer's errors without regard to prejudice. In the exam-
ple, the lawyer's default frustrated the defendant's efforts to get a hearing of his claim on
the merits, despite the fact that that claim might have cast serious doubts on his conviction.
Because, on the whole, counsel's performance could not be deemed "incompetent," review of
the effect of this particular action by counsel was precluded. This approach thus makes the
reviewing court's finding of competence or incompetence crucial. A defendant whose lawyer
falls just above the threshold level of competence defined by the appellate court receives a
categorically different level of protection than one whose lawyer falls just below that
threshold.
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portant constitutional questions. The first is whether the right-to-
counsel clause of the sixth amendment includes any guarantee of
competent counsel at all.22 A second question is whether that guar-
antee is predicated upon showing prejudice in addition to incom-
petence, and, if so, what showing of prejudice suffices. 23 A third is
whether the due process guarantee of a fair trial, to which incom-
petent counsel claims were originally referred, has indeed been su-
perseded by the "overlapping but more stringent standards" of the
sixth amendment.24 If not, the substantive content of the fair trial
guarantee, which the Court has elaborated only indirectly, must be
addressed head-on.2 5
Despite the courts' varying descriptions of and sources for the
right to effective assistance of counsel, all formulations of that
right are an amalgam of two characterizations, one procedural or
dignitary, the other substantive. The procedural characterization
endows the right to effective assistance of counsel with an abstractimportance, independent of the impact of the infringement of that
right on the reliability of the verdict; the substantive characteriza-
tion of the right views it as concerned only with the impact of inef-
fective counsel on the outcome of the trial. The thesis of this com-
ment is two-fold. First, the comment asserts that the source in the
text of the Constitution of a defendant's substantive right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel is the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments; the procedural right to effective assis-
tance is located in the sixth amendment. Second, the comment as-
serts that a defendant has no procedural right to competent coun-
sel beyond a right to the appointment of counsel who appears
competent at the time of appointment; the defendant's substantive
right to effective assistance, however, protects the defendant from
any act or omission of counsel that casts doubt upon the reliability
of the defendant's verdict.
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT APPROACHES TO THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT
COUNSEL
The sixth amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence,"26 seems the logical place to
22 See infra notes 35-69 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 33, 138-77 and accompanying text.
24 Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
25 See infra notes 138-77 and accompanying text.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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begin in considering what guarantees of competent counsel the
Constitution affords. Courts that rely on the sixth amendment as
the constitutional basis for a right to competent counsel have
adopted two different interpretations of that right, the "prejudicial
incompetence" approach and the "abstract competence" approach.
The two are similar insofar as both depend upon the sixth amend-
ment and both require some form of inquiry into counsel's "com-
petence." They differ in that the former requires a defendant to
show that prejudice resulted from counsel's incompetence, while
the latter does not. This section analyzes and criticizes, on the ba-
sis of both history and policy, the underpinnings of both ap-
proaches. It argues that an independent inquiry into "competence"
based on an abstract notion of competent counsel is undesirable. It
also suggests that the sixth amendment, if properly construed, is of
only limited aid to defendants seeking guarantees of competent
counsel, and requires only that any counsel appointed by the trial
court be competent at the time of appointment.
A. The Prejudicial Incompetence Approach
1. Description. All but three federal courts of appeals27 and a
majority of state courts28 have now adopted some version of the
prejudicial incompetence approach. Though there are many ver-
sions of this approach, they all share three common features. First,
though incompetent counsel claims remain technically cognizable
under the due process clauses, courts find there is no need to en-
gage in due process analysis because that analysis has been super-
seded by the "overlapping but more stringent" requirements of the
sixth amendment.2" Second, the right to counsel clause is found to
include a right to competent counsel.30 Third, only incompetence
that prejudices the defense offends the sixth amendment; in order
to obtain a new trial a defendant must establish both that counsel
was "incompetent" and that counsel's incompetence adversely af-
2'7 The three circuits that have not adopted the prejudicial incompetence approach are
the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 896-900
& nn.11-20 (surveying law in other circuits), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
28 See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4TH 27, 109-41 (1980) (surveying law in the state courts).
2 E.g., Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
20 E.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 & n.27 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc). The right to
competent counsel has been held to be either a right to counsel who is generally competent
or a right to counsel who discharges certain specific duties. See infra notes 34, 88 and ac-
companying text.
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fected the defense. 31
Significant variation exists in the application of the prejudicial
incompetence approach. Courts using this approach disagree as to
both the standard of competence the sixth amendment guarantees
and the degree of prejudice that must be shown to make out a vio-
lation of that guarantee. Yet most courts do seem to agree that
only gross and obvious errors constitute incompetence for sixth
amendment purposes, 2 and that the defendant must show that
counsel's incompetence is likely to have affected the outcome of
the trial.3 3 The manner of employing the test also varies from court
to court. As a general rule, however, defendants are required first
to show that counsel was incompetent overall and then to demon-
strate some further, specific harm going to the reliability of the
verdict.3 4
S E.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331-33 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1974).
3' The courts typically use such language as "reasonably effective," e.g., Washington v.
Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451
(1983), or "within the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases," e.g.,
United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978); see infra notes 88-90 and ac-
companying text; see also McMann v. Richardson, 347 U.S. 759, 774 (1970); Cooper v. Fitz-
harris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
83 See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 896-900, nn.11-20 (discussing the law in
the federal circuit courts), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 2451 (1983); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4TH 27, 109-41 (1980) (discussing the law in the state
courts). This standard does not hold sway in all courts, however. A substantial minority
requires only that the defendant show a genuine possibility that the outcome was adversely
affected. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). A few courts have held that a substantial adverse impact on the
defense satisfies the prejudice requirement without regard to any definite effect on the out-
come. See, e.g., Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1262 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112,
1115 (3d Cir. 1970).
3' Many courts using this approach treat the two steps as completely independent.
These courts are able to avoid the issue of prejudice by finding counsel's overall perform-
ance competent as an initial matter. See, e.g., Langford v. State, 354 So. 2d 297, 307-09 (Ala.
Crim. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 354 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1977); Green v. State, 579 P.2d 14,
16 (Alaska 1978); Allen v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 642, 643, 217 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1975); State v.
McNulty, 60 Hawaii 259, 269-70, 588 P.2d 438, 446 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979);
State v. Hyatt, 281 N.W.2d 716, 716 (Minn. 1979). They can also avoid the issue of compe-
tence entirely by finding the specific errors alleged insufficiently prejudicial. See, e.g., Gus-
tave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980); People v. Tripp, 19 Ill. App. 3d 200,
204-05, 311 N.E.2d 168, 172 (1974); State v. King, 262 N.W.2d 709, 710 (Minn. 1978); Com-
monwealth v. Walley, 262 Pa. Super. 496, 504, 396 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978).
Other courts intertwine the inquiries. Some have suggested that prejudice sufficient to
reverse must have been foreseeable and that a generally creditable performance is not ren-
dered defective by a single mistake. See, e.g., Springer v. Collins, 586 F.2d 329, 332-33 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 404 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). By contrast, some cases suggest that a single error, if
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2. Analysis.
a. Authority for the Prejudicial Incompetence Approach. The
heart of the prejudicial incompetence approach is its requirement
of a two-step inquiry: first, a general showing of overall incompe-
tence by counsel, and second, a specific instance in which that in-
competence genuinely prejudiced the defendant's case. The basis
for this two-step inquiry, and the basis for the prejudicial incom-
petence approach in general, is found in dicta from several Su-
preme Court decisions interpreting the scope of the right to coun-
sel.35  That right, argue the proponents of the prejudicial
incompetence approach, includes a right to effective counsel, un-
derstood as counsel who is competent or whose incompetence does
not prejudice the defense."8
What little historical evidence exists suggests that the right to
counsel clause was originally intended only to protect "the right of
an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a
lawyer to assist in his defense. ' 37 The government's obligation was
a negative one. It could not interfere in a defendant's decision or
efforts to obtain counsel. Neither could it prevent his counsel from
appearing. No affirmative responsibilities either to provide counsel
or to ensure his effectiveness were originally intended.8
sufficiently egregious, may be grounds for bypassing the question of counsel's overall per-
formance and granting a new trial. See, e.g., Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir.
1979); United States ex rel. Lee v. Rowe, 446 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (N.D. I1. 1978); Common-
wealth v. Roundtree, 469 Pa. 241, 248-51, 364 A.2d 1359, 1362-64 (1976).
3" See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955) (interpreting due process clause); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70
(1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (interpreting due process clause). The
reach and meaning of these dicta are discussed infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
37 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979).
38 See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-36 (1955). Professor
Beaney cites evidence from the first Congress to demonstrate that the sixth amendment did
not concern the appointment of counsel. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for criminal
defendants to plead and manage their own cases "personally or by the assistance of such
counsel ... as by the rules of the said court ... shall be permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein." Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 90 (emphasis added). The day fol-
lowing passage of the Judiciary Act, the sixth amendment was proposed by Congress to the
states without any discussion to suggest that the right to counsel clause altered this statu-
tory rule. W. BEANEY, supra, at 28.
A second act, adopted by Congress several months prior to the ratification of the sixth
amendment, provided for the appointment of counsel in capital cases. See Act of April 15,
1790, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118-19. As Professor Beaney points out, "[i]f the proposed Sixth
Amendment counsel provision included a guaranty of appointed counsel in all felony cases,
why did Congress pass this halfway measure?" W. BEANY, supra, at 28.
This hypothesis about the original reach of the right to counsel clause is supported by
1388 [50:1380
Effective Assistance of Counsel
In light of this apparent original intent, it is difficult to argue
that the right to counsel clause was intended specifically to guaran-
tee all defendants that the state bear the risk of defense counsel's
incompetence."9 It is most unlikely that the right to counsel clause
was intended to oblige the state to bear the risk of prejudicial er-
rors by the attorney into whose presence, identity, or choice of de-
fense the state was prevented from intruding. To argue that the
original intent of the sixth amendment included a guarantee of at-
torney competence gives the right to counsel clause, construed ac-
cording to its drafters' understanding, a distinctly peculiar cast. On
the one hand, indigent defendants would have no guarantee of the
benefit of counsel at all; on the other hand, defendants able to re-
tain counsel would be guaranteed by the state that their retained
counsel would perform competently at trial.
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court must restrict
the right to counsel clause, in accordance with its originally in-
tended meaning, to a guarantee of unhindered freedom to hire a
lawyer. The Court has already "departed from the literal meaning
of the Sixth Amendment. ' '40 Nonetheless, the likely original mean-
ing of the right to counsel clause should serve as a reference point
for measuring the extent the Court has given to those departures.41
the fact that throughout the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth no
federal appeals were brought alleging denial of the right- to have counsel appointed as a
violation of the sixth amendment. See id. at 29-31. In practice both the federal government
and many states provided by statute for appointment of counsel in capital cases, and, by the
turn of the century, the custom in many federal courts was to appoint counsel routinely in
felony cases. Id. at 29-30. The common understanding seems to have been that this custom
was an exercise of the court's supervisory power and not a matter of constitutional right. Id.
The Supreme Court's approach to developing the right to have counsel appointed pro-
vides additional indirect confirmation that such a right was not intended by the framers.
Neither in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), nor in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), did the Court argue that historical evidence supported an indigent's sixth
amendment right to have counsel appointed; Zerbst relied purely on policy considerations,
304 U.S. at 462-63, and Gideon simply relied on Zerbst's reading of the sixth amendment,
372 U.S. at 339-40. This omission is all the more remarkable because in Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942) (overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)), the Court
concluded, largely on the basis of historical evidence, that similarly worded provisions in a
state constitution did not include a right to have counsel appointed. Id. at 465-71.
39 See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 219, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring). Apart from this historical evidence, the language of the clause
could bear such a reading; "enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel," U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI, might be read to bestow on defendants a right to an attorney who will in
fact assist in the defense. Prejudicial incompetence could then be said to deny the assistance
such a right demands.
40 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979).
41 Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 254-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
(discussing the relevance of the historical purpose of the writ of habeas corpus for the writs
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The first relevant departure occurred in Johnson v. Zerbst42
and Gideon v. Wainwright.43 These cases establish the right of an
indigent defendant to have counsel appointed by the court at the
state's expense. 4 The opinions do not themselves indicate whether
providing the indigent with a lawyer suffices or whether the state,
at least to some extent, must also guarantee that lawyer's compe-
tence; nor do the opinions discuss the rights of non-indigent defen-
dants. Zerbst and Gideon simply transplant the right of indigent
defendants to appointed counsel, first enunciated in Powell v. Ala-
bama, to the sixth amendment, and, in so doing, extend that
right to successively larger classes of cases. 46
Lower courts that have adopted approaches to the right to
competent counsel based on the sixth amendment read considera-
bly more into these sixth amendment cases than the right to have
counsel appointed. These courts hold that the Supreme Court's
references to a right to "effective assistance of counsel, '47 and sim-
ilar expressions in cases such as Powell,48 Avery v. Alabama,4 9
Glasser v. United States,50 and Reece v. Georgia,51 demonstrate
that the Court reads the sixth amendment as a guarantee of coun-
sel who actually performs competently at trial.2 The watershed
case for this interpretation of the right to competent counsel was
contemporary constitutional scope).
42 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
43 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 The groundwork for these departures from the original intent of the right to counsel
clause was laid in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the Court held that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment included the right of an indigent defendant
to have counsel appointed in a capital case. The trial court had initially appointed the entire
local bar and made a more specific appointment only on the morning of trial. The Court
held that the duty to appoint "is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid." Id. at 71.
4 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see supra note 44.
46 Powell held that due process requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
in capital cases. 287 U.S. at 71. Zerbst held that the sixth amendment requires appointment
of counsel for indigents in all federal criminal cases. 304 U.S. at 463. Gideon applied this
aspect of the sixth amendment to the states via the fourteenth amendment. 372 U.S. at 342.
Subsequent decisions delineating the limits of the holding in Gideon do not alter the limited
nature of the right discussed, namely, the right of an indigent defendant to have counsel
appointed. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
47 E.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980).
48 287 U.S. at 71 ("effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case").
" 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) ("The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel can-
not be satisfied by mere formal appointment.").
50 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) ("effective appointment of counsel").
51 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) ("effective assistance of counsel").
52 See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692-93 (6th Cir. 1974); Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
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McMann v. Richardson.3 Prior to McMann, only a few courts and
commentators insisted on reading the Supreme Court's opinions as
establishing a sixth amendment guarantee that counsel perform ef-
fectively or competently; indeed, support for such a reading was
scant.5 4 The Supreme Court's references in pre-McMann cases to
the right to "effective assistance" of counsel refer, without excep-
tion, to the right to have the court exercise its authority in such a
manner as not to prevent effective assistance.5 In McMann, the
Court appeared to find a right to effective performance by counsel,
stating that, "if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the
mercies of incompetent counsel .... 56 Since that decision, most
federal courts of appeals have adopted a general sixth amendment
right to counsel who performs competently.5 7
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 318 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1963); Goforth v.
United States, 314 F.2d 868, 871 (10th Cir. 1963); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Rep-
resentation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
289, 289-305 (1964).
"I In Powell, the Court held the appointment of counsel to have been ineffective be-
cause it was made "at such a time and under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid." 287 U.S. at 71. Avery suggests only that appointment under circumstances
not affording counsel a chance to prepare a defense may be an appointment that contra-
venes the sixth amendment-a proposition obvious after Powell-but then adds that such a
claim may be rebutted by evidence showing that counsel actually performed competently.
308 U.S. at 445, 452. Glasser refers to effective assistance of counsel in the process of hold-
ing that to force the defendant to accept counsel with conflicting interests, like appointing
counsel without adequate time for preparation, violates the defendant's sixth amendment
rights. 315 U.S. at 176. Finally, Reece holds that a procedural default rule requiring chal-
lenges to the composition of a grand jury to be raised before indictment, if enforced against
a defendant whose attorney was appointed after indictment, effectively reduces appoint-
ment to a useless formality and so contravenes the sixth amendment. 350 U.S. at 89-90. In
all these cases, the notion of "effectiveness" is one of a requirement that the court not exer-
cise the duty to appoint in such a manner as to prevent counsel's assistance from being
effective. This is a far cry from an assurance that counsel will perform effectively.
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955), the companion case to Reece, provides addi-
tional evidence that the Court had found no right to competent performance of counsel in
the sixth amendment. In rejecting defendant's claim that he was denied "effective represen-
tation" of counsel, the Court cited only a federal court of appeals opinion that decided a
competency of counsel claim under the "farce and mockery" standard of the due process
clause. Id. at 101 (citing United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir.
1948)). See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "farce and
mockery" standard.
56 397 U.S. at 766. As the discussion below demonstrates, this appearance is somewhat
deceiving and is dispelled once such language is considered in context. See infra notes 61-69
and accompanying text.
17 E.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo
v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Beasley v.
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b. McMann. The defendant in McMann claimed that his
guilty plea was invalid because entered on the erroneous advice of
appointed counsel. The Court treated the defendant's attack on
counsel's advice as a claim that the defendant had been induced to
enter an unintelligent and therefore voidable guilty plea. 8 It held
that whether the plea was unintelligent turned "not on whether a
court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or
wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 59 The Court then
added, in dictum, that "defendants facing felony charges are enti-
tled to the effective assistance of competent counsel." 0
Dicta, of course, may be persuasive, but the McMann Court
offered no argument in support of its broad assertion beyond cita-
tion to Powell, Avery, Glasser, and Reece.6 1 References to "effec-
tive assistance" of counsel in these cases do not support a general
right to competent counsel beyond the right to counsel who is com-
petent when appointed.2 Moreover, the dictum comes in the con-
text of a general admonition to trial courts to safeguard the rights
of defendants and is thus more a suggestion of the trial court's
duties than an explicit recognition of an independent constitu-
tional right.
Any apparent support found in McMann for a right to compe-
tent performance by counsel must be understood in light of the
ultimate issue in that case, the intelligence of McMann's waiver of
numerous trial-related constitutional rights by pleading guilty. In
order to evaluate the intelligence of the waiver, the Court in Mc-
Mann had to choose between engaging in a subjective inquiry into
the defendant's actual understanding of his bargaining position in
light of the state's evidence against him and using the quality of
counsel's advice as an objective indicator of the intelligence of that
waiver. The McMann Court chose the latter. 3 Its emphasis on the
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-
37 & n.25 (3d Cir. 1970).
'8 397 U.S. at 766-75. A guilty plea, because it is a waiver of several fundamental rights
related to trial, must be voluntary and intelligent. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver of constitutional right must
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent).
397 U.S. at 771.
Id.
1 Id.
42 See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
3 Cf. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) ("The focus of federal habeas
inquiry [into a claim of having pled guilty on faulty advice of counsel] is the nature of the
advice and the voluntariness of the plea . . . ."); L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 80, at 320
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competence of counsel in the guilty-plea context is better seen as a
concession to administrative ease in the face of the difficulties in-
herent in the analysis of a waiver than as a recognition of any gen-
eral right to competent performance by counsel.
There is a still more compelling reason to read McMann's ref-
erence to competent counsel as a requirement limited to the guilty-
plea context. The state has compelling reasons for seeing that
guilty pleas are not upset. Not only are such pleas deemed particu-
larly reliable, 4 but the state interest in finality is strong where it
has refrained from proving its case in reliance on the defendant's
plea.6 5 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have read McMann to
find that strong state interests in not upsetting a guilty plea justify
a constructive waiver of all of a defendant's claims except those
going to the fact of his guilt.6 Yet, as the McMann court recog-
nized, constructive waivers, however justified, may divest a defen-
dant of otherwise valid claims that should not be foreclosed
through the incompetent advice of defendant's counsel.6 7 To the
argument that fairness requires that the defendant be left some
means to raise meritorious claims that he would not have waived
had he been fully informed, the Court has made a small conces-
sion: the defendant can attack counsel's competence in advising
the defendant to plead guilty." By focusing on the overall quality
(arguing that the aim of the holding in McMann was to minimize the number of guilty pleas
that will be upset on collateral attack). This emphasis by the Court on the quality of advice
is analogous to the importance ordinarily attached by reviewing courts to the quality of
explanations given by the trial court to a defendant who proposes to waive a fundamental
right. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (defendant who wishes to represent
himself should be informed by court of dangers and disadvantages of waiving right to coun-
sel); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948) (plurality opinion) (in determining
whether waiver of right to counsel is voluntary and intelligent, a court must make more than
a "mere routine inquiry" in investigating circumstances of a case). In both areas the quality
of the advice acts as a surrogate for an inquiry into the defendant's subjective understand-
ing. The reasons for using such a surrogate are even stronger in a case such as McMann
because the communications between lawyer and client are both privileged and outside the
record, whereas those between judge and defendant are made in open court.
U See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 269 (1973) (justifying treatment of guilty
plea as a constructive waiver of a defendant's other attacks on his conviction on the ground
the defendant "has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged"); Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 296 (1975) (White, J.,
dissenting) (guilty plea establishes guilt "by as reliable a method as is known to the criminal
law-[the defendant's] solemn admission of guilt, made in open court").
:5 Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 289 (1975).
6 E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see McMann, 397 U.S. at 768,
772; L. YAcKLE, supra note 6, § 102. An exception is made for claims depriving the state of
jurisdiction to try the defendant. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974).
67 397 U.S. at 770-71; see infra note 68.
69 This interpretation of the reasoning for McMann's allowance of attack on counsel's
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of counsel's advice, the Court avoided a result that would have re-
quired full review of the merits of the defendant's underlying
claims in order to determine whether or not his waiver was
unintelligent.0 9
competence is strengthened by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Menna v.
New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975). In that case, the Court held that a guilty plea removes even
the issue of factual guilt from the case, id. at 62 n.2, leaving only attacks on counsel's com-
petence. Professor Yackle agrees that a guilty plea waives all constitutional fair-trial rights
save the right to competent counsel:
[As an alternative to contesting his indictment], the defendant may choose self-convic-
tion by way of a plea of guilty, in which case the defendant will have the benefits of
any plea bargain that can be worked out with the prosecution but will give up the
procedural safeguards that would attend a trial and the availability of further review of
any alleged failure to respect those constitutional rights. A defendant who pleads guilty
is left, accordingly, with only the claims that can be raised against the voluntariness of
the plea itself ....
L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 102, at 403 n.70.
6" McMann, 397 U.S. at 768, 772; cf. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 258, 267 (1973)
(claims of prior constitutional deprivations "are not themselves independent grounds for
federal collateral relief").
Given these reasons for distinguishing McMann, it can fairly be said that the lower
courts have attached undue weight to its dictum concerning the right to competent counsel.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases, most notably Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980),
have contained dicta similar to McMann's, but the Court has yet to countenance a proce-
dural sixth amendment right to competent counsel unequivocally. In any event, such dicta
certainly do not foreclose the possibility that the Court will adopt a more restrictive reading
of the right to counsel clause when it fully considers the issue in a case that squarely
presents it.
Cuyler states, albeit in dicta, that a new trial is required where the defendant can show
that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest arising from joint representation and that
this conflict adversely affected his counsel's performance, id. at 350-even though the trial
court had no notice as to that conflict of interest, id. at 348, and even though counsel was
retained, not appointed, id. at 344-45. The Court's holding, read broadly, interprets the
sixth amendment to include a procedural right to counsel who is free from conflicts of inter-
est that adversely affect his performance. See id. at 349-50 (demonstration by defendant of
an actual conflict makes out a sixth amendment violation without the need for a showing of
prejudice). Because this procedural right refers to counsel's actual performance as part of
the definition of the right, Cuyler establishes that the Court reads the sixth amendment to
include at least one guarantee concerning counsel's actual performance: the state bears the
risk that counsel's performance will be impaired by an actual conflict of interest.
In the limited context of conflict-of-interest cases, Cuyler represents a rejection of the
analysis proposed in this comment. This comment's analysis, if applied to conflict-of-inter-
est cases, would require reversal only if the trial court were on notice of the existence of a
conflict (in which case there would be a breach of the trial court's duty to ensure counsel's
competence ex ante, see infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text) or if an undisclosed
conflict caused outcome-determinative prejudice to the defense (in which case the verdict
would be unconstitutionally unreliable as a matter of due process, see infra notes 175-77
and accompanying text).
Nonetheless, there is good reason to adopt a different approach to incompetent counsel
claims from that adopted by Cuyler for conflict-of-interest claims. The effects of a conflict
of interest are cumulative and pervasive; it is ordinarily easier to identify the conflict than
to determine its effects. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (once an actual
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c. Policy. Given the lack of historical support for a sixth
amendment procedural right to competent counsel, it is unclear
what end is served by requiring a preliminary showing of incompe-
tence in addition to a showing of prejudice attributable to coun-
sel's acts or omissions. One unavoidable problem in criminal trials
is that of deciding which of the two parties should bear the risk of
any errors by defense counsel. Many courts seem to use the incom-
petence requirement as a risk-allocating device.
An early approach to this problem of risk allocation held that
the risk of an error should be borne by the party whose fault led to
the error. Since a defendant's lawyer may be deemed his agent, the
defendant can be held responsible if he chooses a bungling lawyer
as his agent.70 Under this approach the defendant should always
conflict is shown, the court will not "indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice"). By contrast, the difficulty of making a hindsight assessment of competence is at
least as great as the difficulty of determining the effects of counsel's conduct on the outcome
of the trial. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. Thus, inquiry into the presence
of conflict of interest is a more appropriate surrogate for a case-by-case determination of
prejudice than is an inquiry into the presence of incompetence.
Moreover, a conflict of interest handicaps any lawyer in his representation of the defen-
dant, as do such other defects as senility, insanity, drunkenness, and disloyalty, regardless
of the lawyer's skill. Such impediments to counsel's efforts can sensibly be singled out from
the run of incompetent counsel claims for per se treatment. See Mitchell v. United States,
259 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (contrasting "skill" and "relative competence" with
"physical or mental disability on the part of counsel, or ... intoxication, fraud or misrepre-
sentation, dual interest, insufficient time for preparation, or inadequate notice[,] ...
[which] have special features"). Because the undivided loyalty of counsel is rightly viewed
as an essential element of the the attorney-client relationship, conflicts also offend the ac-
cused's dignitary right to representation, cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56 (1932) (ef-
fective appointment of counsel requires that counsel be given "clear appreciation of respon-
sibility [and] impressed with [an] individual sense of duty").
Finally, the scope of the holding in Cuyler is quite limited when read in light of Hollo-
way v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Holloway requires reversal where the trial court, upon
counsel's representation that a conflict has arisen, fails either to appoint substitute counsel
or to determine that no conflict exists. Id. at 484. Thus, Cuyler applies only in the sub-
classes of cases in which either counsel fails to notify the trial court of the presence of a
conflict of interest, or the trial court mistakenly determines that counsel's representations
are unfounded. As to the latter cases, the state should clearly bear the risk of the trial
court's error. As to the former, once one accepts the Court's premise that a conflict of inter-
est is overwhelmingly likely to prejudice the defense, and given that counsel is charged
under Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485-86, with the role aftd responsibility of detecting conflicts of
interest in representing his clients, it is a very small step to the conclusion that the state
should bear this particular risk in the small number of cases in which it will actually occur.
By contrast, the adoption of a procedural sixth amendment right to competent counsel
would shift a broad range of risks to the state in a very large number of cases. The policy
argument against recognition of such a right will be taken up infra notes 91-120 and accom-
panying text. Plainly, Cuyler v. Sullivan leaves ample room for such arguments outside the
narrow context in which that decision arose.
70 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 865 (1953); People v. Stevens, 5 Cal. 2d 92, 98-99, 53 P.2d 133, 136 (1935); People
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bear the risk of any error by counsel.71
Although this agency theory has been generally abandoned,
the notion of allocating risk by fault that underlies it has not. Only
the means of determining fault has been changed. Under the preju-
dicial incompetence approach, defense counsel's incompetence is
now used as the means of allocating the risk of counsel's error.
Where error results from defense counsel's incompetence, the gov-
ernment is presumed at fault, and so it must bear the burden of
counsel's error; where error does not result from counsel's incom-
petence, for example, where counsel fails to introduce exculpatory
evidence because he had insufficient time to uncover it, the error is
no one's fault, and hence no grounds exist for shifting the risk of
that error from the party on whom it would otherwise fall, the
defendant."3
The allocation of the risk of defense-counsel error involves two
assumptions: first, that counsel's incompetence implies fault on the
part of the state while its absence precludes such fault; second,
that errors by counsel are necessarily the fault either of the state
or of the defendant and therefore that the risk of those errors can
be allocated on the basis of such fault. Neither of these assump-
tions withstands scrutiny. Though the government has a duty to
safeguard the rights of a defendant and ensure him a fair trial,7 '
v. Barnes, 270 IlM. 574, 579-80, 110 N.E. 881, 883 (1915); People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350,
354, 165 N.E.2d 551, 554, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697, 700 (1960).
71 See Waltz, supra note 54, at 296-97.
7 See Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 927, 929 n.10 (1973).
73 Courts that adopt the prejudicial incompetence approach assume that the sixth
amendment protection it embodies exhausts the defendant's claims against the state stem-
ming from the incompetence of his counsel. Unless the defendant can satisfy the two-step
inquiry and show overall incompetence as well as prejudice, no new trial is granted for er-
rors by counsel; the defendant must bear the risk of such errors even though they are not
his fault and even though they adversely affect the outcome of his trial. See Cooper v. Fitz-
harris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (collecting cases to that effect),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). As the present discussion demonstrates, not only is there
little basis in reason for requiring an inquiry into "competence," but this requirement ig-
nores the existence of the due process fair trial guarantee. It is the position of this comment
that, under the fair trial guarantee, prejudicial error by counsel that is likely to be "out-
come-determinative" requires a new trial regardless of whether counsel was otherwise com-
petent. See infra notes 138-206 and accompanying text.
7" Cf. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336-38 (5th Cir.) (finding of state action in
connection with retained counsel's incompetence is necessary, and requires a showing "that
some responsible state official connected with the criminal proceeding who could have reme-
died the conduct failed in his duty to accord justice to the accused."), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1011 (1975). A trial court's general duty to safeguard the rights of defendants is fundamen-
tally a matter of due process. From this premise, one can argue that the due process protec-
tion of defendants' rights, specifically the rights embodied in the incorporated sixth amend-
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the incompetence of defendant's counsel does not always result
from a breach of that duty. Many aspects of counsel's performance
either occur outside the trial court's notice or reasonably appear to
be, though they are not in fact, competent. 75 Thus, the existence of
incompetence does not necessarily imply fault on the part of the
state. Similarly, many errors, though the result of failures of com-
munication between counsel and a confused and ignorant defen-
dant,7" lack of time,7 7 tactical choice, or other factors not the prod-
uct of counsel's incompetence,7 8 may cast doubt on the reliability
of the defendant's verdict. The fact of competence does not pre-
clude errors detrimental to the defendant that are not his fault. It
seems unfair to shift the burden of all such errors to the
defendant.79
A rejection of the chain of inference from incompetence to
fault to risk allocation need not compel the abandonment of in-
competence as a risk-allocating principle altogether. The use of
ment, requires the court to examine the competence of counsel. There is little doubt that
the prejudicial incompetence approach is saturated with elements of due process protection,
hence its focus on prejudice and the overlap in results between the prejudicial incompetence
approach and a pure due process approach. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
However, there is nothing in the due process clause that compels an examination of compe-
tence aside from the prejudicial effects of counsel's errors. See infra notes 138-77 and ac-
companying text. Nothing in the general due process notion of safeguarding defendants'
rights supports or provides an excuse for undertaking the inquiry into competence of coun-
sel. Id.
.. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 277-78 & n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (noting that counsel's most crucial work is done out of court and
thus out of the judge's knowledge); see infra text following note 102.
7'6 The law, at least since Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), has taken such handi-
caps of defendants into account. See id. at 68-73. The preclusiveness of a finding of general
competence on the part of counsel is thus inconsistent with the solicitude for a defendant's
inability to defend himself that runs through the decisions. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 465 (1938) ("The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to
protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance.").
'7 See Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Consti-
tutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 981, 996-98 (1982).
73 Decisions of counsel which turn out, in hindsight, to damage the defendant's case are
frequently judged according to just such factors. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text. To the defendant, possibly convicted wrongfully, such solicitude for the realities of
being an attorney is cold comfort. Moreover, a b-product of this judicial propensity to
judge attorney competence in light of the time and resources available to the attorney is
that defendants with limited resources or court-appointed attorneys are likely to bear the
risks of attorney error disproportionately, even when their attorneys are personally able. See
Comment, supra note 77, at 996-98 & n.102.
79 It is the thesis of this comment that where an error by counsel that prejudices the
defendant is the fault of neither party, the burden of that error should remain, as does the
burden of prejudicial errors in general, on the party who has the original responsibility for
showing the reliability of the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, the government. See infra
notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
1983] 1397
The University of Chicago Law Review
fault as a risk-allocating principle is a vestige of the agency theory;
it is certainly possible to eliminate fault and use incompetence di-
rectly. Such an approach would put the risk of all errors by defense
counsel, regardless of prejudice, on the government if those errors
result from counsel's incompetence. A theoretical justification for
such an allocation could be based on the notion that a defendant
has a procedural right to competence of counsel at trial; this is in
essence the "abstract incompetence" approach. Standing alone,
such a procedural right to competence is theoretically coherent.
For a variety of reasons, which will be set forth in the next sec-
tion,80 it is, however, practically undesirable. In any event, as the
proponents of the abstract incompetence approach point out, a
procedural right to competent counsel is obviously irreconcilable
with the showing of prejudice required by the prejudicial incompe-
tence approach. If a defendant has a procedural right to competent
counsel, then a showing that his counsel was incompetent would
demonstrate a violation of that right. Any inquiry into prejudice
would be utterly unnecessary.
Despite the untenability of incompetence as a justification for
shifting the burden of counsel's error, such burdens must still be
allocated; one party or the other necessarily bears the risk. If in-
competence is an inappropriate measure, the other half of the prej-
udicial incompetence approach, prejudice, must be pressed into
service as a risk-shifting principle; where an error is prejudicial,
the state should bear the risk.
If prejudice is to be the risk-allocating factor, then the incom-
petence inquiry becomes completely superfluous and the only de-
fense for such an inquiry might be that it serves as a screening
device for violations of the ultimate substantive right, freedom
from outcome-determinative prejudice. Such a role depends on the
validity of one of two inferences: either the presence of competent
counsel implies the absence of prejudice, or the presence of incom-
petence implies the existence of prejudice. We have already seen
that the former is unsound; the latter, that incompetence implies
prejudice, is as easily refuted. A conviction resting on the eyewit-
ness testimony of twenty bishops cannot be called into question by
counsel's failure, on cross-examination, to raise the fact that one of
them was the victim's uncle.
Of course, the lack of an absolute correlation between incom-
petence and prejudice does not rule out the argument that an in-
80 See infra notes 91-120 and accompanying text.
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competence inquiry is an administratively convenient screen for
easy cases where no prejudice has occurred. Such an approach
would lead to cases where a reviewing court would refuse to over-
turn a defendant's conviction even where counsel, though compe-
tent, committed prejudicial error. Even if we set aside the likely
constitutional question that such a use of incompetence would
raise, the justification for using incompetence as a proxy for
prejudice, administrative convenience, is simply unfounded. Defin-
ing competence is an extremely difficult task;81 it is just as easy, if
not easier,82 to determine prejudice directly.
Incompetence, though so employed by courts using the preju-
dicial incompetence approach, is irrelevant to the unavoidable task
of allocating the risk of error between the defendant and the state.
The remaining step in the inquiry, prejudice, allocates the risk of
prejudicial error by counsel to the state, while leaving the risk of
harmless error by counsel on the defendant. Thus, the prejudicial
incompetence approach, while nominally recognizing a purely pro-
cedural right to counsel who performs competently, at bottom re-
jects such a right in favor of the substantive right to have one's
guilt determined exclusive of counsel's outcome-determinative er-
rors. This rejection, sub silentio, of the purely procedural right to
counsel who performs competently accords with the conclusion
suggested by our examination of the sixth amendment's history.
B. The Abstract Competence Approach
1. Description. Two federal courts of appeals and one state
employ the "abstract competence" approach.8 Most recent law re-
view commentary urges adoption of this approach in whole or in
81 See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
22 Determining whether an error is prejudicial and, if so, whether that prejudice is out-
come determinative is a task familiar to judges. It is done in connection with evidentiary
errors as well as constitutional violations under the respective harmless error doctrines. No
such claim can be made for a court's ability to ascertain competence.
83 These are the Fourth Circuit, see Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968) (coun-
sel must perform specified duties; breach requires new trial subject to rebuttal by showing
of harmless error), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1969), the Sixth Circuit, see Beasley v. United
States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (automatic reversal upon finding counsel ineffective),
and Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 393 A.2d 642 (1978) (defen-
dant need not show prejudice once ineffectiveness is established).
Panel decisions adopting this approach have been overruled by two other circuits sitting
en banc, but only over vigorous dissents. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (en banc), revg 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d
1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'g 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974
(1979).
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part.8 4 The abstract competence approach departs from the preju-
dicial incompetence approach by rejecting the notion that the sixth
amendment right to competent counsel is qualified by a prejudice
requirement.8 5 Under the abstract competence approach, a new
trial is ordinarily required once incompetence is shown." The right
to competent counsel is thus regarded as an unconditional guaran-
tee of competence by the sixth amendment. 87 Generally speaking,
the nature of the competence inquiry used by courts that adopt
the abstract competence approach differs from that of courts using
the prejudicial incompetence approach. Whereas the prejudicial in-
competence approach usually focuses on counsel's overall compe-
tence, courts adopting the abstract competence approach fre-
quently define competence in terms of a list of specific duties owed
by defense counsel to the defendant.8 8 Trial courts are expected to
84 See, e.g., Lasater, The Role of Harm in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases:
Practice and Policy, 32 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759, 791-800 (1981); Ineffective Representation as
a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 48-53, 71-87 (1977); Comment, United States v. Decoster-An Alternative Ap-
proach for Reviewing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the D.C. Circuit, 68
GEo. L.J. 1261, 1273-82 (1980); Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L. REv.
752, 763-72 (1980).
85 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) ("The heart of this approach lies in defining ineffective assistance in terms of
the quality of counsel's performance, rather than looking to the effects of counsel's actions
on the outcome of the case."); see Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1969).
86 See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275-95 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1969).
87 This unqualified guarantee is occasionally diluted by subjecting it to harmless error
rebuttal. Compare. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
bane) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (harmless error rebuttal allowed) with Cooper v. Fitzharris,
551 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (1977) (harmless error doctrine inapplicable), rev'd, 586 F.2d 1325
(9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). Even where the harmless error
doctrine is applied, however, counsel's errors are not measured by their effect on the out-
come, Decoster, 624 F.2d at 293-94 (Bazelon, J., dissenting), as is the rule where harmless
error rebuttal is permitted. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (harmless
error means harmless in terms of outcome). Rather, this approach determines whether an
error is of a type which can contribute to skewing verdicts generally. See Decoster, 624 F.2d
at 277-78 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (discussing duty to investigate). Thus, diluting the un-
qualified nature of the approach by permitting harmless error rebuttal does not alter the
essentially prophylactic nature of the rule; the state may be required to retry the defendant
although his legal guilt remains undoubted.
See infra note 90. These include the duty to investigate the facts, to interview ad-
verse and friendly witnesses, to communicate regularly with the defendant, to conduct pre-
trial discovery, and to conduct a vigorous trial defense. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d
196, 276 & n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
1400 [50:1380
Effective Assistance of Counsel
supervise compliance with the enumerated duties;89 substantial
breach of an enumerated duty constitutes a violation of the sixth
amendment right to competent counsel.90 The absence of a
prejudice requirement fundamentally alters the purpose of the
competency inquiry the court must make, and hence the analysis
of its desirability.
2. Analysis.
a. Abstract Competence as a Prophylactic Rule. Making in-
competence of counsel ground for a new trial without regard for
the effect of that incompetence on the verdict turns the right to
effective assistance into a prophylactic procedural guarantee. A
prophylactic right to counsel who performs competently at trial
finds little support in the history or purposes of the sixth amend-
ment or in the general jurisprudence of prophylactic rules. As
noted above, neither the original intent of the framers nor subse-
quent interpretations by the Supreme Court supports a guarantee
that counsel perform competently.9 1 The sixth amendment sup-
ports no more than the right of an indigent defendant to have ap-
pointed counsel who, when appointed, appears able to perform
competently.
Requiring the state to guarantee the competent performance
of defense counsel gives the state every incentive to assert control
over the manner in which counsel conducts each phase of the de-
fense;9" that incentive is increased where competence is defined as
a checklist of duties. Some advocates of this approach welcome the
implication that trial courts should supervise the preparation and
presentation of the defense by counsel, 3 and find that the sixth
amendment requires trial courts to monitor either counsel's com-
Id. at 296-98 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 281-82 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). It should be noted that though the most com-
mon variants are prejudice with general incompetence and no prejudice with specific incom-
petence, the prejudice requirement and the choice of general or specific test of competence
are completely independent. Removing the prejudice requirement while retaining a general
test of competence makes finding a constitutional violation turn solely on the reviewing
court's assessment of counsel's competence. E.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166
(1977), rev'd, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
Retaining some form of prejudice requirement but focusing on counsel's performance of spe-
cific tasks makes a threshold finding of incompetence far more likely than under a general
definition of competence, because the creditable aspects of counsel's performance are not
balanced against his specific failures. See e.g., United States ex rel. Lee v. Rowe, 446 F.
Supp. 1039, 1045, 1047 (N.D. I1. 1978).
*1 See supra notes 35-69 and accompanying text.
,2 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (plurality
opinion), 228-29 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
*3 Id. at 293 n.145, 297-99 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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petence or counsel's compliance with each of the enumerated du-
ties.94 Yet such supervision intrudes on the constitutionally pro-
tected relationship between attorney and client, and undermines
the traditional neutrality of the judge. The sixth amendment con-
templates that judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel will serve in-
dependent roles in assuring fair trials to criminal defendants.9 5
Specifically enumerated duties have been rejected by most courts
precisely because they threaten both counsel's independence and
the trial court's neutrality.96 The sixth amendment "entitle[s the
defendant] to the trial judgment of his counsel, not the tactical
opinions of the judge.19 7
In general, prophylactic rules, such as the one advocated by
courts adopting the abstract competence approach, operate to re-
quire a new trial whenever a given procedure is denied, without
regard to the specific effect of that denial on the fairness of the
trial. Such rules are not adopted lightly. Usually, the Supreme
Court has adopted a prophylactic rule only when the procedural
right involved is seen as so indispensable to a fair trial that it is
implausible even to assert that a trial in which that right was vio-
lated was fair; the rule must involve a matter so fundamental that
specific inquiries into the effect in any given case are superfluous.98
In addition, the Court usually adopts a prophylactic rule only after
observing a pattern of abuse in the state courts that demonstrates
the necessity for a uniform, federally enforced rule.9" The right to
9The penalty for failure to comply is a new trial, subject to variations with regard to
the role of the harmless error doctrine, see supra notes 86-87, and to certain exceptions for
insubstantial or excusable breach, see United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 281-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
"Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth amendment contemplates indepen-
dent, adversary positions for state and defendant that mandate that state and defendant be
to some extent isolated from one another); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(same). In recognition of this need for independence, some constitutional protection has
been extended to the attorney-client relationship even in civil cases. See Maness v. Myers,
419 U.S. 449, 467-68 (1975); id. at 472 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"See United States v. Decoster 624 F.2d 196, 208 & n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(plurality opinion), 228-29 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
'7 Id. at 229 (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d
787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958)).
8 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (right to production of exculpatory evidence); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337 (1970) (sixth amendment right of defendant to be present is not so absolute as to
justify a prophylactic rule); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) (same for right to cross-
examination).
"See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (pre-trial interrogation); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
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competent counsel meets neither of these requirements for prophy-
lactic rules. It has never been seriously contended that "compe-
tent" counsel is "a procedure ... necessary to an Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty." 100 The Supreme Court does not even
regard the appointment of counsel, much less an assurance of his
effectiveness, as indispensable to a fair trial in every case. 10 1 Fi-
nally, there has been no showing of a pattern of abuse in the state
courts justifying such an absolute rule.
b. Costs of the Abstract Competence Approach. Unlike the
right to have counsel appointed,102 an unconditional rule requiring
the state to assure that counsel is effective unfairly burdens the
state. The state has virtually no control over a non-indigent defen-
dant's choice of retained counsel, and very little control over the
actual performance of counsel whether appointed or retained. The
state cannot always reliably determine in advance that counsel will
prove competent, nor can a reviewing court be confident that it has
correctly determined that counsel was incompetent. Thus the state
may therefore be punished for an error largely outside its control,
although that error may have had no bearing on the reliability of
(1961) (exclusionary rule for fourth amendment violations); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) (new trial for coerced confessions); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
65 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that Gideon was a response to failure of state
courts to appoint counsel at appropriate times); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAIF. L. REv. 929, 950 (1965) (arguing that the Court should con-
tinue to limit the development of prophylactic rules to deterrence of undesirable state mis-
conduct and not allow enforcement of affirmative behavior); Packer, The Courts, The Po-
lice, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRim. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 238, 239 (1966) (discussing
how a pattern of state abuse leads the Court to develop prophylactic rules).
10' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968). This is not to say that a criminal
defendant has no claim when counsel is ineffective. It is merely to note that this claim is
subsumed under his more general claim to a fair and reliable trial. See infra notes 138-77
and accompanying text. Thus, as a procedural right, the right to counsel who is competent
and effective is not so fundamental as to require protection other than freedom from the
prejudicial effects of any errors by counsel at the defendant's trial. See id.
1*1 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369-74 (1979) (sixth amendment does not require
state to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant charged with a statutory offense for which
imprisonment is authorized but not imposed); cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37
(1972) (declining to require that counsel be appointed for criminal charges not leading to
imprisonment).
102 It is clearly within the state's power to control the appointment of counsel to indi-
gent defendants. Even in the absence of state-created public defender services, the common
law powers of courts to compel attorney service are well established. See Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932); Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's
Role, 93 HARv. L. RFv. 633, 635 n.12 (1980). Compliance by the state can, moreover, be
readily ascertained, ensuring that the state will know when it has fulfilled its obligations,
and that it will be "penalized" by a reviewing court only when it in fact has not fulfilled
them. The same cannot be true of a prophylactic rule which guarantees "competence." See
infra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
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the defendant's conviction.
Competence and effectiveness are not susceptible of precise
definition. Errors by counsel labeled "incompetence" will often not
involve a clearly measurable procedural irregularity; yet under the
abstract competence approach, a new trial is required whenever a
reviewing court determines that counsel has been "incompetent."
This outcome exalts a guarantee that can only constructively be
called procedural fairness over state interests in the finality and
the reliability of a verdict. The distortion of the balance among
finality, reliability, and procedural fairness is apparent in the un-
equal treatment accorded defendants whose counsel is marginally
competent and those whose counsel is marginally incompetent.
The former are likely to have no means of obtaining relief, even
from outcome-determinative error, given the operation of state
procedural default rules and the reluctance of appellate courts to
look beyond the trial record.10 3 The latter receive new trials even
where their underlying claims involve errors which are neither spe-
cifically constitutional nor outcome-determinative. 04
In addition, no reason exists to assume that trial court super-
vision will produce superior results. Much attorney incompetence
is caused not by poor skills or indifference but by inadequate time
and undercompensation. 10 5 Overwork and undercompensation,
however, afflict the bench as well as the bar. "Incompetence" of
this variety reasonably can be expected to handicap many judges
as well as lawyers in'the performance of their duties. Indeed, there
is some reason to fear that burdening trial courts with an all-inclu-
sive duty to supervise defense counsel will increase the incidence of
judicial incompetence in the performance of traditional judicial
tasks. Trial court supervision would without doubt lead to better
performance by counsel and hence to speedier and less disruptive
trials in some cases. 08 But this potential is a reason for leaving the
choice and form of trial court supervision "to the good sense and
discretion of the trial courts,"'01 7 rather than for constitutionalizing
a rule or set of rules requiring judges to spend scarce judicial time
in every case. 08 Moreover, not all judges are free from the indiffer-
"0I See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; infra notes 179-82 and accompanying
text.
0 See supra notes 4-6, 9-11 and accompanying text.
'05 See Comment, supra note 77, at 996-97 & n.102.
'" See Schwarzer, supra note 102, at 665.
'07 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
'" This comment does not mean to condemn policy decisions by courts or legislators
that judges should intervene where counsel's performance is seriously ineffective; it merely
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ence to defendants' rights or the lack of professional skill that
some defense attorneys display. To require such judges to super-
vise defense counsel is to make a bad situation worse; the sixth
amendment wisely requires that the defendant not be exposed to
this hazard.
Requiring counsel to perform enumerated duties in every case
also interferes with counsel's ability to use the limited time and
resources at his disposal to the best effect.109 Such a requirement
would encourage counsel to protect himself by going through the
motions of formal compliance rather than protect the defendant by
focusing on the areas where counsel's help is most likely to be use-
ful. The abstract competence approach is as likely to increase the
incidence of incompetent counsel as it is to reduce it, and, in any
event, is likely to create undesirable incentives for both court and
counsel.
c. Impact on Post-Conviction Remedies and Default Rules.
Over and above the constitutional and policy difficulties that beset
the abstract competence approach are its potentially devastating
implications for the administration of post-conviction remedies
and state procedural default rules.110 Although practices vary from
state to state, most state appellate and collateral attack courts
grant new trials for nonconstitutional error only upon a showing of
outcome-determinative prejudice.11 The abstract competence ap-
proach, however, requires no such showing; its definition of compe-
tence permits-perhaps even requires-that counsel's failure to
asserts that the sixth amendment does not require such intervention. Judge Schwarzer has
presented guidelines for intervention designed to forestall incompetence without requiring
the judge to conduct the defense. See Schwarzer, supra note 102, at 661-65 (intervention at
trial), 651-58 (pre-trial monitoring), 659-60 (pre-trial intervention). Such efforts deserve to
be tried, but to claim that the sixth amendment requires such monitoring and supervision of
defense counsel's actual performance is to assume much of what such experiments are in-
tended to confirm or disprove. Judge Schwarzer does not argue that his guidelines are re-
quired by the sixth amendment; indeed, he suggests that the sixth amendment places limits
on the judge's authority to regulate the defense. Id. at 636-39 & n.20, 661-62. This comment
argues that similarly effective but less intrusive forms of regulation have been overlooked.
See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text. The safeguards proposed below are intended
to minimize the conditions that result in ineffective representation without requiring the
trial judge to monitor the actual performance of counsel.
109 Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (For judges to second-guess judg-
ments by counsel as to which of defendant's colorable claims should be raised on appeal
"would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy.").
11 For a discussion of the impact of this comment's proposal on this body of law, see
infra notes 216-26 and accompanying text
"I See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 23 & n.7 (1967) (noting that all 50 states
have harmless error rules and indicating that the state court in that case had construed the
state harmless error statute to require a showing of error that affected the outcome).
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raise a claim that might have been meritorious be held to consti-
tute incompetence. 112 The defendant can deliberately bypass state
remedies, even for state law claims, by recasting the underlying
substantive claim as a "procedural" constitutional defect: incompe-
tence of counsel." 3 Defendants may thereby obtain new trials for
underlying non-constitutional claims through the federal courts
without having to show the prejudice required by the state courts
for relief on those claims. Indeed, given the favorable standard of
review this approach seems to employ,1 4 defendants have powerful
incentives to do exactly that, which is hardly a desirable result for
relations between state and federal courts.
The abstract competence approach also threatens to transform
radically, in both manner and stringency, the review of defaulted
constitutional claims. Under Wainwright v. Sykes," 5 a defendant
can obtain collateral review of such claims only by showing both
cause for the default li8 and actual prejudice from the default to
the outcome of his trial."' The same defaulted claim is subject to
independent and generally stringent review if presented as an in-
competent counsel claim under the abstract competence approach.
In some cases incompetence at trial will prove to be a more diffi-
cult showing than cause for default. However, procedural default of
a colorable constitutional claim strongly implies incompetence,"'
and incompetence is itself cause for such a default.11 9 Furthermore,
112 See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 276 n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (counsel should take all actions necessary to protect defendant's
rights). Judge Bazelon does suggest that claims such as failure to object to inadmissible
evidence could be subject to harmless error rebuttal, id. at 294, but since he rejects any
requirement of outcome-determinativeness, id. at 291 n.136, such claims are still easier to
maintain as incompetent-counsel claims under the abstract competence approach than as
collateral-attack claims under state law. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
11 This can be done with great ease and with virtually any claim. See, e.g., supra notes
8-9 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
-15 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
118 Id. at 87, 90-91.
"1 Id. at 87, 91. Actual prejudice undoubtedly requires some showing of outcome deter-
minativeness. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). In Frady, the Supreme Court
indicated that a showing of "actual prejudice" was greater than a showing of plain error on
appeal. Id. at 166 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). The formulation
of actual prejudice adopted by the Court strongly suggests that a colorable claim going to
legal guilt (i.e., an outcome-determinative claim) is required, at least implicitly, for estab-
lishing actual prejudice. See id. at 172-74.
11 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
119 In Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981), the court held that erroneous
decisions by counsel, even if "short of that necessary to make out a Sixth Amendment
claim," may constitute cause for a procedural default. Id. at 1364; cf. Indiviglio v. United
States, 612 F.2d 624, 631 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (reserving the issue but implying that such
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a showing of such a default will, in most cases, constitute a suffi-
cient showing of incompetence to satisfy the abstract competence
approach. Once incompetence is established under that approach,
the defendant need not show prejudice to prevail on his claim and
receive a new trial. Thus, the availability of an incompetent coun-
sel claim under the abstract competence approach can nullify com-
pletely the actual prejudice requirement for collateral attack im-
posed by Sykes. 120
If both traditional habeas and abstract competence review are
available to defendants, state law claims as well as procedurally
defaulted constitutional claims will be reviewable under two signif-
icantly dissimilar procedures and standards. In the case of state
law claims, this proliferation of modes of review undermines the
state's interest in the enforcement of its procedural rules in cases
involving its substantive law, the class of claims where that inter-
est is strongest. In the case of defaulted constitutional claims, it
accords disparate treatment to defendants raising essentially iden-
tical claims on the basis of a very inexact assessment of attorney
competence.
Analysis of the sixth amendment, and of the current ap-
proaches to the right to competent counsel based on it, demon-
strates several significant points. First, as a matter purely of his-
torical authority and subsequent Supreme Court interpretation,
there is only a limited "right to competent counsel" in the sixth
amendment. The language and history of the sixth amendment,
and, most importantly, existing precedent support no more than
incompetence constitutes cause), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933 (1980).
120 These objections apply with fullest force where failure by counsel to perform specific
duties is deemed sufficient to establish a sixth amendment violation. To a considerable ex-
tent, however, they apply to any approach to incompetent counsel claims which requires less
than "actual prejudice" for procedurally defaulted constitutional claims. See supra notes
88-90 and accompanying text.
The abstract competence approach as applied to procedurally defaulted fourth amend-
ment claims is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). Stone held habeas corpus relief unavailable for fourth amendment claims
where there was "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" in the state court. Id. at 494.
Under either sixth amendment approach to incompetent counsel claims, a defendant could
easily escape the strictures of Stone by bringing fourth amendment claims as incompetent
counsel claims in habeas proceedings. Under the abstract competence approach, for exam-
ple, any fourth amendment claim that counsel failed to raise and that might have resulted
in the suppression of evidence would require a new trial so long as the suppression would
have been helpful to the defense. At least one commentator finds this state of affairs a
happy one. See Note, Stone-v. Powell and the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 MiCH. L.
R~v. 1326 (1982) (arguing for relief on sixth amendment grounds even where the sole under-
lying claim is based on the exclusionary rule).
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the right of an indigent defendant to have counsel appointed,
though, as we shall see below,12' that right may be interpreted to
provide a significant guarantee of counsel's apparent competence
at the time of appointment. Second, as a matter of policy, ap-
proaches that oblige the court to inquire into the actual compe-
tency of counsel at trial have little to commend themselves. Incom-
petency inquiries are difficult, unclear, and run counter to the
sixth amendment notion of opposing, independent adversaries.
Constitutionally required trial-court supervision of counsel there-
fore seems undesirable. Finally, definitions of the right that give
dispositive effect to a finding of incompetence circumvent federal
habeas limitations and thwart state interests in procedural default
rules.
III. THE FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEE APPROACH
A. Description
One federal court of appeals122 and many state courts 2 3 still
adhere to the "fair trial guarantee" approach, which, until some
ten years ago, was employed by nearly all state and federal
courts.12 4 Under this approach, a defendant who attacks only the
quality of his counsel's performance fails to state a sixth amend-
ment claim. 1 25 Instead, the courts require the defendant to estab-
lish that, because of counsel's incompetence, the defendant was de-
nied a fair trial, in violation of due process of law. 26 The principal
doctrinal issue under this approach is the scope and content of the
fair trial guarantee. Two variations are encountered.
The older variation, still employed by some courts,12 7 obliges
the defendant to show that "the proceedings were a farce and a
121 See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
122 See United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872
(1977). But cf. Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 624, 629 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979) (indicating it
might reconsider this test in an appropriate case), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933 (1980).
123 See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4TH 27, 99-108 (1980) (collecting cases).
124 See Bines, supra note 72, at 928.
125 E.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
These courts define the scope of the sixth amendment right to competent counsel in the
same manner as this comment: a duty to safeguard defendant's right to appointed counsel
by appointing counsel who appears competent at the time of appointment. See, e.g., Diggs,
148 F.2d at 668. Having posited the existence of a right, however, they fail to provide for its
enforcement. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
126 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
121 See, e.g., id.; Hoover v. State, 270 Ark. 978, 980, 606 S.W.2d 749, 751 (1980); Line v.
State, 273 Ind. 227, 229, 397 N.E.2d 975, 976 (1979).
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mockery of justice." 128 The "farce and mockery" test treats coun-
sel's incompetence as an "evidentiary fact" in the reviewing court's
inquiry into "the presence or absence of judicial character in the
proceedings as a whole. 1 9 Even mistakes by counsel that might
have altered the guilty verdict will not, standing alone, suffice to
establish denial of a fair trial.130 In this view, the fair trial guaran-
tee is exclusively procedural; a new trial is granted only if proce-
dural defects in the trial as a whole amount to a denial of "funda-
mental fairness." '
Most courts that adopt the fair trial guarantee approach have
moved away from the harshness of the "farce and mockery" test.132
They interpret the fair trial guarantee to encompass the reliability
of the verdict as an implicit element of a fair trial. The defendant
need not show that counsel utterly failed to represent him, only
that counsel's mistakes probably affected the outcome of defen-
dant's trial, and hence cast doubt upon his legal guilt.1 33
In addition to showing outcome-determinative prejudice, de-
fendants under either of these versions of the fair trial guarantee
approach are commonly required to attack counsel's competence
on the record. If counsel appears on the record to have defended
his client with any vigor, many courts will refuse to consider spe-
cific errors or matters outside the record on the ground that the
defendant plainly received a fair trial.' Even if counsel compe-
tence is not evident from the record, some courts confine a defen-
dant to the trial record on appeal, despite the potential for claims
relating to counsel's pre-trial performance13 5 or to evidence not in
the record.136
Courts that adopt sixth amendment analyses of competent
counsel problems do not dispute the applicability of this approach.
12 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
2- Id. at 669, 670.
1" Id. at 670. The Diggs court based this holding in part, upon its claim that "[h]ow
much [counsel's] mistakes contributed to the result can never be measured." Id.
121 Id.; cf. Waltz, supra note 54, at 305.
132 See Waltz, supra note 54, at 304-05; Note, The Effective Assistance of Counsel: An
Incomplete Constitutional Right, 18 ME. L. REv. 248, 263 (1966).
133 See, e.g., People v. Dudley, 46 IlM. 2d 305, 308, 263 N.E.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
910 (1970); Schoonover v. State, 2 Kan. App. 2d 481, 493, 582 P.2d 292, 299 (1978).
134 See, e.g., People v. Lee, 43 Ill. App. 3d 807, 812, 357 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1976). In
subsequent habeas proceedings, the federal district court in Illinois criticized the state
court's reliance on the trial record. United States ex rel. Lee v. Rowe, 446 F. Supp. 1039,
1044, 1047 (N.D. IlM. 1978).
I" See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 41 IlM. App. 3d 816, 822, 354 N.E.2d 643, 647 (1976);
Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 601, 604, 502 P.2d 733, 737, 739 (1972).
I" See, e.g., United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1948).
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Rather, they tend to consider it superseded by the "overlapping
but more stringent" requirements of the sixth amendment."" One
reason for this conclusion may well be a lack of understanding as
to the scope and content of the protection provided by the fair
trial guarantee, in particular, the extent to which it protects defen-
dants from outcome-determinative errors on the part of counsel.
The next section will show that the fair trial guarantee protects the
defendant whenever the conduct of his counsel calls into question
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Analysis
That due process of law guarantees criminal defendants a "fair
trial" has been clear at least since Powell v. Alabama,5 5 where the
Supreme Court held that it is "the duty of the court . . . to see
that [the defendants] were denied no necessary incident of a fair
trial." 3 9 The Supreme Court has developed a model of a fair trial
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment makes
binding on the states. This model emphasizes both procedural fair-
ness and substantive reliability. Thus, on occasion the Court has
incorporated rights included in the Bill of Rights because it re-
gards them as necessary to a procedurally fair trial, even where the
condemned unfairness on the state's part contributes positively to
the reliability of the verdict appealed from or of verdicts gener-
ally;140 in other cases, the Court has viewed specific rights as incor-
porated in due process because those rights serve to create the con-
ditions for a reliable verdict.14 1
The fair trial guarantee is a subcategory of due process.142 The
137 Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
138 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
139 Id. at 52.
"0 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (exclusionary rule for illegally ob-
tained confessions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (same for illegally obtained
evidence).
141 E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (confrontation clause); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965) (same); see also Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295
(1968) (per curiam) (applying confrontation clause decisions retroactively because "the con-
stitutional error presents a serious risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have
been reliably determined").
I'l The court has often spoken of due process as a guarantee of "fundamental fairness,"
e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), or "fundamental
rights," e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). This guarantee has led to the incorporation into the due process clause of cer-
tain rights, such as the fourth amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), that evince a more general concern
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fair trial guarantee narrows the general due process inquiry into
"fundamental fairness" by focusing on fairness in the context of an
adversary factfinding proceeding. The Supreme Court has elabo-
rated the attributes that a fair and reliable trial must possess,
thereby making it possible to identify specific violations of the fair
trial guarantee.143 Many such violations trigger specific rights im-
ported from the Bill of Rights.14 The present inquiry concerns a
second category-violations of specific rights inherent in the fair
trial guarantee itself.145 In this, its purest manifestation, the fair
trial guarantee embodies an element of substantive due process.
Powell v. Alabama14 6 clearly demonstrates this concern with
the substantive fairness of the trial and the reliability of the ver-
dict. The defendants' convictions in that case were obtained under
extremely suspect conditions. 147 In particular, the trial court,
though required by state law to appoint counsel, did so in such a
manner as to preclude the defendants from receiving any real aid
from counsel. 148 Several alternative grounds for reversing were
available to the Supreme Court: the Court could have reexamined
the state court findings that the appointment did not violate state
law; it could have incorporated the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel into the due process clause; or it could simply have declared the
trial to have been, on the whole, a "farce and mockery. ' 149 The
with the proper balance between state power and individual liberty.
"1' The fair trial guarantee does not encompass the more pervasive kinds of unfairness
that may inhere in particular circumstances surrounding the trial. Such unfairness still falls
within the purview of the due process clause. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
(due process includes the right not to have evidence obtained by forcible stomach pumping).
1"'E.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148
(1968) (collecting cases).
"5 E.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976) (due process requires prosecu-
tion to disclose evidence "giving rise to a legitimate doubt on the issue of guilt"); Foster v.
California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (admission of unreliable eyewitness identification vio-
lates due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process right to have prose-
cution disclose exculpatory evidence).
146 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14 The trial occurred "in an atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public senti-
ment." Id. at 51. The entire process from arraignment to conviction seemed designed to
railroad the defendants. See id. at 51-58.
14' First, the trial court appointed the entire bar, charging no one lawyer with the duty
of aiding the defendants. In the atmosphere that pervaded the trial it was unlikely that any
lawyer would have assumed that duty independently. Id. at 56. A more specific appointment
was not made until the time of trial, "within a few moments" of the time defendants were to
be "put in peril of their lives." Id. at 58.
141 Several facts made the "farce and mockery" course the simplest. The court appar-
ently accepted allegations by the defendants that their trial was mob-dominated and largely
proforma. See supra notes 147-48. The dissent below appears to have come to a similar
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Court chose not to adopt any of these alternatives.150
Instead, the Powell Court derived, from the due process re-
quirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, a right to be
heard through retained counsel in all cases, civil or criminal, state
or federal.' 5 ' The Court also found, in response to the defendants'
inability, as a practical matter, to establish their own innocence,
that the due process clause embodies a right to have counsel ap-
pointed in capital cases. 52 Thus, the fair trial guarantee was inter-
preted as protecting reliable factfinding as well as procedural fair-
ness, and hence serves as an independent source of constitutional
protection for criminal defendants in addition to the constitutional
rights incorporated into it. 5s Our next task is to delineate the
scope and form of this protection.
conclusion. Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 554, 141 So. 201, 214 (1932) (Anderson, C.J., dis-
senting). Finally, precedent supported this conclusion. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91
(1923), and Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915), had recognized that "if in fact a
trial is dominated by a mob so that there is an actual interference with the course of justice,
there is a departure from due process of law . . . ." Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91. Frank had
taken a very restrictive view of the power of a federal habeas court to grant relief or to make
new factual findings where the state appellate court found no mob domination. See 237 U.S.
at 335, 336. The Moore Court, however, both broadened the scope of federal habeas review,
see 261 U.S. at 92, and suggested that the Supreme Court could find the fact of mob domi-
nation itself:
[I]f the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask-that counsel, jury and judge were
swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State
Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for correction
nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an
immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners
their constitutional rights.
Id. at 91.
1o 287 U.S. at 50, 51, 52, 66, 67-68. Despite claims that each of these rights was vio-
lated, the Powell Court expressly confined its inquiry to the defendants' claims concerning
denial of counsel as a violation of due process. Id. at 50.
I'l Id. at 69. This conclusion does not rely even implicitly on the sixth amendment,
which is expressly limited to "all criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
16' 287 U.S. at 72. The Powell Court expressly limited its holding to the facts of the
case before it, id. at 71, but as the Court's later decisions show, that limitation does not
apply to the principles enunciated in Powell. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343
(1963) (applying the right to counsel to the states in all felony cases in part on the basis of
Powell's "unmistakable" recognition of "the fundamental nature of the right to counsel").
Similarly, though the Court buttressed its interpretation of the fair trial guarantee by refer-
ence to the practice in most states of appointing counsel in capital cases, the validity of its
reasoning is independent of both state practice and the sixth amendment. See 287 U.S. at
73. Indeed, at the time Powell announced a limited right to appointed counsel under the
rubric of the fair trial guarantee, it would still be six years before the sixth amendment was
interpreted to include any right to have counsel appointed, even in capital cases. See John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
15 The substantive aspect of the fair trial guarantee is vividly illustrated by the opin-
ions of Justice Black, principal architect of the Court's interpretations of the sixth amend-
ment and the right to have counsel appointed. Six years after Powell, Justice Black held for
the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), that the right to counsel clause requires
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One view of the fair trial guarantee was announced by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in 1945 in Diggs v. Welch.154 The Diggs
court held that attacks on the quality of counsel's performance
would merit relief only when the defendant was able to show that
his trial was fundamentally unfair.1 5 A trial is fundamentally un-
fair, the court announced, only when, on the whole, it is a sham, a
"farce and mockery" of justice.15 Though incompetence may con-
tribute to making a trial a farce and mockery, standing alone it will
rarely be sufficient. In effect, the Diggs holding reduces the fair
trial guarantee to a guarantee of procedural regularity;1 57 it does
not involve an assessment of the impact of counsel's errors on the
reliability of the verdict.
This exclusively procedural interpretation of the fair trial
guarantee can fairly be traced to the baleful influence of Betts v.
Brady.""5 In Betts, the Court narrowly construed Powell v. Ala-
federal courts, as a condition of depriving a criminal defendant of "life or liberty," to ap-
point counsel. Id. at 463. He relied, not on text or history, but on the "policy of the modern
criminal law" requiring appointment of counsel in serious cases and on Powell's description
of the importance of counsel in securing procedural fairness and a reliable verdict for the
defendant. Id. (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69). The fair trial guarantee as interpreted in
Powell served as the principal support for the Court's creation of the sixth amendment right
to appointed counsel. Of course, as this line of cases shows, the concern with reliability
present in the fair trial guarantee may lead to the adoption of a specific procedural right on
the ground that the procedure is necessary if reliability is to be preserved. It does not follow
that the substantive aspect of the fair trial guarantee must always require that a procedure
be applied categorically to certain classes of cases.
Furthermore, both in his opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and in
his dissent in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342,
Justice Black argued, along with his usual argument for incorporation, that the fair trial
guarantee, as interpreted in Powell, requires extension of the right to appointed counsel to
indigent felony defendants. In Betts, Justice Black quoted Powell on the importance of
counsel to a fair trial and argued that a trial is not fair unless it is possible "to conclude,
with [a] satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant's case was adequately
presented." 316 U.S. at 475-76 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69). In Gideon, Justice Black
once again quoted Powell on the need for counsel, and held that "in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person ... who is too poor to hire a lawyer[] cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him." 372 U.S. at 344. The fair trial guarantee is used in
these cases in two distinct ways: as the vehicle for incorporating the sixth amendment into
the due process clause, and, more to the point for present purposes, as an independent
source of support for the right to appointed counsel.
148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
155 Id. at 669.
" Id. at 669-70.
157 See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir.) (effective assistance of
counsel is "a procedural requirement, as contrasted with a standard of skill"), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958).
Is$ 316 U.S. 455 (1942) overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
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bama, mistakenly treating it as resting on a state-created right to
appointed counsel. 15 9 Betts created a presumption that compliance
with state law satisfies due process unless the trial itself was a
sham, and hence invalid."' 0 A defendant could overcome the pre-
sumption of a fair trial only by showing either that the trial was a
travesty, or that special circumstances made a particular procedure
fundamentally unfair as applied to him.""1
Betts was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,1 6 2 which re-
vived the earlier view of the fair trial guarantee expressed in Pow-
ell itself.0 s As previously noted, this view of the fair trial guaran-
tee seeks not only to insure procedural fairness, but also to protect
the reliability of the verdict.1 " Actions of an attorney that fall
short of calling the fairness of the trial as a whole into question
may still impugn the reliability of the verdict and in this way
amount to a denial of due process. The "farce and mockery" stan-
dard adopted by Diggs ignores reliability entirely; as a conse-
quence, at least since the Supreme Court revived the Powell inter-
pretation of the fair trial guarantee in Gideon, this standard has
been inconsistent with prevailing law. The question still remaining
is the scope of protection accorded by this reliability aspect of the
fair trial guarantee.
In In re Winship,1 65 the Supreme Court, seeking to insure the
reliability of verdicts, held that due process requires that criminal
defendants be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every element of the offense charged." 6 According to the
1"9 Id. at 463. The Betts Court rendered this mistaken interpretation of Powell in spite
of a declaration by the Powell Court that it was "powerless to interfere" with the state
court's finding of compliance with state law. 287 U.S. at 60.
160 316 U.S. at 464.
161 Id. at 473. The Betts Court decided that appointment of counsel was not required
"in all cases" as a matter of "natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of fairness." Id.
at 464. The Court arrived at this conclusion by examining only the historical and contempo-
rary practice in the states. Id. at 464-71. The Court seems to have reasoned that the general
rules constituting due process are presumptively defined by state practice, so that compli-
ance with state law in any particular case constitutes presumptive compliance with due pro-
cess. Powell had alluded to no such presumptions.
162 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
161 See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
265 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
I" Id. at 362-64. The Court repeatedly refers to the fundamental importance of the
reasonable doubt standard to the American scheme of justice and argues that "[iut is a
prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." Id. at 363.
The Court concludes:
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is
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Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 1 7 the Winship holding means that
"no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal convic-
tion except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of every element
of the offense."' 16 8 If the defendant can demonstrate on appeal that
any rational factfinder would have entertained a reasonable doubt
about the conviction, that conviction violates due process and can-
not stand.169
United States v. Agurs70 illustrates the proper application of
this due process standard for a reliable verdict. In Agurs, a murder
trial in which the defendant pleaded self-defense, the prosecution
failed to disclose to the defense that the victim had a prior crimi-
nal record of assault and carrying a deadly weapon. Agurs thus
obliged the Court to define the scope of the defendant's right to
have the state disclose exculpatory evidence.' Whether this fail-
ure to disclose is sufficiently material to constitute a violation of
due process, the Court held, depends upon the standard of materi-
ality used. 7 2 The Court specifically rejected a standard that fo-
cuses on preparation of an effective defense "rather than [on] the
materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.' 7 3
The court concluded:
The proper standard of materiality must reflect our over-
riding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a
finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establish-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows
that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been
committed.'7 "
also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt ....
Id. at 364. The holding, though supported by the Court's invocation of 200 years of practice,
seems to rest solely on the concern for reliability of the verdict embodied in the due process
clause and first recognized in Powell.
167 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
148 Id. at 316.
9" Id. at 316-18.
170 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
17, This right of disclosure, an example of a substantive rule supported only by the due
process clause that seeks to insure reliable factfinding, see supra note 145 and accompany-
ing text, was first recognized in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963).
,72 427 U.S. at 111-12.
,71 Id. at 112 n.20.
17, Id. at 112 (footnote omitted).
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Plainly, under Winship, Jackson, and Agurs, if, but for an at-
torney's acts or omissions, the factfinder would likely have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, the state
cannot convict the defendant consistently with due process. 17 5 The
"right to competent counsel" is the right to counsel who does not
adversely prejudice the defendant in an outcome-determinative
fashion; such a right, by definition, invokes society's interest in
convicting defendants only upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.176 Defendants may thus raise claims based upon incompe-
17 Agurs represents a change in formulation of the due process guarantee of a reliable
verdict from the Jackson requirement that any reasonable factfinder would have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt, see supra text at notes 167-69, to a requirement that the actual
factfinder would likely have entertained a reasonable doubt. The difference in formulation
can be traced to the different contexts in which the standard arose. In Jackson, the issue
before the Court was the general quantum of evidence required to overturn a jury verdict of
guilty on due process grounds. In Agurs, the Court was called upon to assess the degree of
importance of specific suppressed exculpatory evidence, relative to the evidence as a whole,
that would require reversal of a conviction on due process grounds. In any event, since a
doubt that is reasonable to one reasonable factfinder is very likely reasonable to any reason-
able factfinder, the distinction between the two formulations is, as a practical matter, far
smaller than it appears to be as a theoretical one.
1276 It might be argued that cases such as Agurs involve acts or omissions committed by
the prosecutor, i.e., the state, and thus deserve different treatment than those of defense
counsel. Outcome-determinative prejudice caused by the state, so the argument goes, is not
the same as outcome-determinative prejudice caused by defense counsel. Defendant, not the
state, must bear the risk and the consequences of his own counsel's acts. This argument is
reminiscent of one justification for the incompetence inquiry of the prejudicial incompe-
tence approach, see supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text, and it is subject to the same
criticism. The kind of error at issue here, caused by defense counsel, is such that neither the
state nor the defendant himself appears to be actually responsible. The question remains:
who must bear the risk of this error.
According to Winship, Jackson, and Agurs, unless defendant can fairly be held guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, his conviction violates due process. Nowhere is it even implied
that the source of any doubt must be somehow attributable to the state, so long as the
necessary quantum of doubt is found. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 (state has an "overriding
interest that 'justice shall be done' ") (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)); Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64, 372. For this reason alone, the state should bear the
consequences of outcome-d terminative prejudice caused by defense counsel.
Two other reasons support allocating this burden to the state. First, it is the state that
prosecutes the defendant and compels him to defend himself. Under ordinary doctrines of
state action, the fact that it is the state that creates this situation provides some basis for
attributing counsel's conduct to the state. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343, 344-45
(1980) (rejecting a distinction, for sixth amendment purposes, between retained and ap-
pointed counsel because "the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in
the defendant's conviction."); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1345-46 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 1011 (1975). Second, the defendant,
being legally untrained and frequently unfamiliar with the criminal justice system, may not
realize the significance of what occurs during a criminal prosecution. By contrast, the prose-
cution can more safely be charged with knowledge of the significance of events occuring
during the prosecution. Cf. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (prosecution presumed to realize signifi-
cance of highly probative evidence).
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tence of counsel without asking the court to inquire into some ill-
defined notion of competence. To make out a due process viola-
tion, the defendant need only establish that counsel's acts or omis-
sions were such that the factfinder would likely have entertained a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt had they not
occurred. 177
As was noted earlier, some courts adopting the fair trial guar-
antee approach impose either or both of two additional restric-
tions: first, a vigorous defense may preclude review of counsel's
specific errors,17' and second, errors occurring outside the trial it-
self and off the record are often held unreviewable. 17 9 The former
is simply unjustifiable. It is no more than a diluted version of the
prejudicial incompetence approach, 80 subject to all the criticisms
applicable to that approach and deprived of even the putative au-
thority of the sixth amendment. It finds no support in the fair trial
guarantee.
A reluctance to extend the protection of the fair trial guaran-
tee beyond the courtroom is more easily defended because the
state has no way to control what counsel does or fails to do before
trial or outside the courtroom.' 8 ' Ultimately, however, it should
not matter whether counsel's conduct occurs before or outside the
trial rather than at it. Reliability may be called into question as
much by matters off the record as by matters occurring at the ac-
Thus, if the defendant can show that his trial is likely to have been unreliable
within the meaning of Winship, he receives a new trial whenever that defect can fairly be
traced to counsel's acts or omissions. This proposal does not require that the state bear the
risk of any erroneously omitted evidence. It argues that since the assistance of counsel must
be provided by the state as a necessary condition of a fair trial, when that condition does
not in fact produce a trial with a reliable verdict within the meaning of Winship, the defen-
dant should receive a new trial. This analysis need not be applied beyond the right to
counsel.
17 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
s See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
1s1 Moreover, trial courts cannot wrest control of pre-trial preparation away from coun-
sel without offending the sixth amendment's expectation of an independent attorney. See
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (plurality), 228-29
(MacKinnon, J., concurring); supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Finally, outside the
trial context there is no established course of procedure upon which to base a judgment of
irregularity before proceeding to consider whether its effects unfairly prejudiced the defen-
dant. These criticisms, however, are inapposite. The right in question is defined without
regard to any procedural context. Its focus is on the reliability of the verdict in recognition
that due process requires more than adherence to a ritual to imprison someone. The trial
court need not monitor what counsel does nor adjudge it irregular. All that matters is
whether there is a likelihood that counsel prejudiced the result in an outcome-determinative
manner.
1983] 1417
The University of Chicago Law Review
tual trial."5 2 Winship, Jackson, and Agurs hold that where there is
a likelihood of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, due
process will not tolerate a conviction. Nothing in these decisions
implies a limitation to the record, 183 nor does the absence of such a
limitation compel the trial court to devise supervisory mechanisms
to prevent unreliable verdicts,"8  since the question of procedural
regularity and fairness is not at issue.
A yet more serious objection exists to the way the fair trial
guarantee approach is applied by most courts. Competence is pre-
sumed from an attorney's good standing in the bar and freedom
from patent disabilities such as insanity or senility.8 5 Moreover,
this presumption applies to appointment as well as to conduct at
trial, so that trial courts are presumed to have appointed compe-
182 Several state courts focus, or have focused, on whether a substantial defense was
overlooked by counsel as the test for granting a new trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Safer-
ian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974). In People v. lbarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464,
386 P.2d 487, 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1963),, overruled, People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412,
422-23, 590 P.2d 859, 864-65, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737 (1979), which nominally adhered to the
"farce and mockery" test, Justice Traynor held that where counsel's "failures[s] ... result[]
in withdrawing a crucial defense from the case, the defendant has not had the assistance to
which he is entitled." 60 Cal. 2d at 464, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866. If the defense
is crucial, it should not matter whether its availability can or cannot be inferred from the
record.
183 If viewed as a matter of burden or risk allocation, the same arguments which sup-
port allocation to the state for trial errors apply equally to errors occurring outside the
courtroom. See supra notes 70-73, 176 and accompanying text. It may seem plausible to
distinguish the non-trial context. One might argue that once the defendant has a lawyer, his
ability to defend himself through' discovery and production of evidence is considerably en-
hanced. Particularly where his lawyer's performance at trial cannot be faulted, it does not
seem unfair to make the defendant bear the risk that he or his counsel will, for example,
overlook highly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, it might be argued, the state has given
the defendant ample opportunity to defend himself at trial, and the state's interest in final-
ity suggests that the exacting burden of proof required by due process should be. applied
only to the trial that actually took place, not to the hypothetical trials that might have
taken place had counsel acted differently. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 337 & n.12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prison-
ers, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441 (1963).
Neither of these arguments is persuasive in light of Winship and its progeny. The right
recognized in these cases allows no room for arguing that procedural fairness is adequate
compensation for an unreliable verdict, and the state's interest in finality is not altered
when the "hypothetical" trial is one based on something which occurred outside rather than
inside the courtroom-in both cases it is equally "hypothetical."
18 Indeed, as was discussed in connection with the sixth amendment approaches, such
supervision should be carefully circumscribed. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying
text.
185 See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 270 Ark. 978, 980, 606 S.W.2d 749, 751 (1980); People v.
Jackson, 41 Ill. App. 3d 816, 820, 354 N.E.2d 643, 646 (1976); Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265,
272, 578 P.2d 1183, 1187 (1978).
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tent counsel.""6 These presumptions cannot withstand scrutiny. It
assumes, contrary to common knowledge, that criminal trial work
is not a specialty in which competence comes only through experi-
ence. To suggest that any attorney could competently try a crimi-
nal case without special expertise was implausible even when crim-
inal trials were vastly simpler than they are today. More
importantly, application of this presumption to appointed counsel
ignores the constitutional status of the trial court's duty to appoint
and, as a result, fails to provide the careful scrutiny of appointed
counsel which the sixth amendment requires.187 Thus, the fair trial
guarantee approach, while basically sound, remains incomplete.
The following section proposes to combine the ex post substantive
protections of the due process clause with the ex ante procedural
protections of the sixth amendment.
IV. A MODIFIED FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEE APPROACH
A. The Fair Trial Guarantee
The approach this comment proposes rejects a sixth amend-
ment "right to competent counsel," whether substantive or proce-
dural. The right to counsel found in the sixth amendment is lim-
ited to prohibiting state interference with the defendant's ability
to obtain counsel or with counsel's ability to represent the defen-
dant.188 The indigent's right to appointed counsel, however, pro-
vides a much greater degree of protection than most courts have
heretofore attributed to it. 189
As a corollary to the right to appointed counsel announced in
M People v. Jackson, 41 Ill. App. 3d 816, 850, 354 N.E.2d 643, 646 (1976). This pre-
sumption was at one time practically irrebuttable, and it perhaps remains so in some juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Line v. State, 273 Ind. 353, 356, 397 N.E.2d 975, 977 (1979); Greentree v.
State, 265 Ind. 47, 55, 351 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1976). Whether its preclusive force has been di-
minished or not, this presumption remains objectionablej See infra note 187 and accompa-
nying text.
167 Even before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), applied the right to counsel
clause to the states in felony prosecutions, it was clear that whenever due process required
appointment of counsel, due process also required appointment of counsel who appeared
capable of mounting a competent defense. See Powell v.' Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); see also infra note 194. After Gideon, these
older due process cases dealing with the right to counsel who appears competent at the time
of appointment can, of course, be construed alternatively under the right to counsel clause.
Whatever the source of the right to appointed counsel, the right to counsel who appears
competent when appointed is a corollary to and deserves as much "enforcement" by review-
ing courts as the right to appointed counsel itself.
8 See supra notes 35-69 and accompanying text.
's' See id.; infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
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Johnson v. Zerbst °90 and Gideon v. Wainwright,9' the Court has
interpreted the sixth amendment to guarantee not only that coun-
sel be appointed for indigents, but that appointed counsel reasona-
bly appear capable, at the time of appointment, of performing
competently and effectively on defendant's behalf.19 2 When a trial
court appoints counsel, it in effect exercises the indigent defen-
dant's right to choose counsel, a right which the defendant's pov-
erty prevents him from exercising himself. In order to prevent the
appointment of counsel from becoming "a sham and nothing more
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that
an accused be given assistance of counsel,"' 93 the court bears the
responsibility for insuring that, when the appointment is made, the
lawyer it appoints reasonably appears capable of providing assis-
tance.1 94 Procedures for securing this right are proposed below. 95
Under this comment's approach, claims relating to counsel's
actual conduct before and during trial are ordinarily cognizable
only under the due process clause, whether counsel is appointed or
retained."" The fair trial guarantee inherent in due process re-
quires that a defendant be given a new trial whenever he shows
that counsel's acts or omissions are likely' 97 to have adversely af-
190 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
191 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
191 See, e.g., Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). For a definition of competence
and a proposal for insuring ex ante likelihood of competence, see infra notes 207-15 and
accompanying text.
191 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (footnote omitted).
19 See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955) (appointment of counsel cannot be
made in such a way as to preclude the giving of effective aid); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (the sixth amendment contemplates appointment by the court so as to
insure that the assistance of counsel shall be effective and not impaired); Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (if counsel who cannot aid is appointed, the right to appointed
counsel is reduced to a sham); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (the court cannot
appoint counsel in such a manner as to preclude real assistance).
191 See infra notes 207-15.
19 Extreme failures by counsel such as total, pervasive failure to conduct any defense
arguably would violate the sixth amendment. For instance, it would be disingenuous to
claim that the right to appointed counsel was vindicated when counsel, though appointed,
never even came to court. Such extreme failures are equivalent to a denial of the right to
counsel altogether. Alternatively, such extreme failures of representation at trial can be
characterized as violations of the procedural aspect of the fair trial guarantee. Cf. Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) ("the denial of the opportunity for appointed counsel to
confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appoint-
ment into a sham and nothing more than formal compliance with the Constitution's require-
ment that an accused be given assistance of counsel"). Beyond these extreme cases, how-
ever, competent counsel claims should be decided under the reliability aspect of the fair
trial guarantee.
7 A defendant generally bears the burden of proof on the issues he raises in any post-
conviction proceeding, appellate or collateral, and that burden is one of showing an error to
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fected the outcome of his trial and hence his legal guilt.198 If, when
viewed on the record as a whole, a defense that counsel did not
raise, a witness that counsel did not call,-evidence that counsel
overlooked, or an objection that counsel failed to make, or some
other error by counsel, would likely have created a reasonable
doubt in the mind of a rational factfinder, then the defendant did
not receive a fair trial.199 Such a showing requires a new trial
whether or not counsel's overall performance would be considered
competent. Incompetence per se is relevant only in cases where
counsel's performance amounted to a total and pervasive failure to
conduct the defense, i.e., cases in which, as a class, the reliability
of the verdict is obviously called into doubt.00
There is a good deal of overlap between the modified fair trial
guarantee approach this comment proposes and the prejudicial in-
competence approach used by most courts today. While there is an
obvious analytical difference between primary reliance on the fair
be more likely than not. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 6, at 26 n.86 (state habeas corpus), §
8, at 35 n.62 (state coram nobis), § 135, at 502 n.37 (federal habeas corpus challenge to state
conviction), § 135, at 513 n.80 (federal habeas corpus challenge to federal conviction). Under
the analysis proposed here, the defendant is attacking his "guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Thus, he must show that it is more likely than not that, but for counsel's acts or
omissions, a rational factfinder would have held such a doubt. This is "likely outcome-deter-
minative" prejudice.
,,1 At a minimum, this formulation is intended to reach claims affecting the defendant's
guilt within the meaning of Winship's assertion that due process "protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364. Matters of defense as to
which, consistent with due process, the defendant rather than the state bears the burden of
going forward or of persuasion, would require a greater showing by the defendant under this
formulation. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
An important question this formulation does not resolve is whether claims affecting the
sufficiency of the evidence against the defendant, but not otherwise undermining the relia-
bility of his conviction, should be viewed as attacks on his legal guilt. For example, consider
a case in which the defendant shows that he would probably have been acquitted but for the
fact that counsel failed to challenge the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. In one sense, the defendant has impeached his guilt: but for counsel's
conduct a rational factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Yet in an-
other sense, the defendant has left his guilt unimpeached: the evidence going to his guilt
would have been excluded not because it was unreliable but because it was unconstitution-
ally obtained. Resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this comment.
29' Many courts that now employ an approach similar to that proposed here do not go
this far. One of the most frequently employed devices for precluding claims is the "trial
tactics" characterization; if it appears that counsel's challenged acts or omissions appear to
have been tactical rather than inadvertent or incompetent, many courts treat that decision
as outside the scope of review. See, e.g., United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737, 739-40 (8th
Cir. 1974); Durham v. Blankenship, 461 F. Supp. 492, 500 (W.D. Va. 1978), appeal dis-
missed, 609 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1979); People v. Newell, 48 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 268 N.E.2d 17, 19
(1971). This comment rejects preclusion of claims on this ground.
200 See supra note 196.
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trial guarantee and primary reliance upon the right to counsel
clause, the two approaches yield identical results much more fre-
quently than this analytical difference would suggest.201 The sub-
stantive overlap between the prejudicial incompetence approach
and this comment's interpretation of the fair trial guarantee rests
on the similarity between the showings of prejudice they require.
This comment requires a showing of likely outcome-determinative
prejudice. Many courts using the prejudicial incompetence test
have explicitly required an identical showing; 02 others seem clearly
to have such a showing in mind when they speak of prejudice.20 3
Even when viewed in analytical terms, this comment's reliance
on the fair trial guarantee is far from alien to the reliance by the
majority of courts on the sixth amendment. Incorporation of the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause
involves not merely the use of due process as a conduit for apply-
ing the Bill of Rights to the states, but a recognition that due pro-
cess itself embodies these rights.2 04 Because the sixth amendment
has been incorporated into the due process clause, it is only logical
to define the content of the right it guararantees in terms of its
relation to due process, which, in this context entails examining
the sixth amendment in light of the fair trial guarantee. Many
courts nominally employing the prejudicial incompetence approach
actually continue to use the fair trial guarantee as the "touchstone
for a defendant's right to effective counsel. '20 5 Others evaluate
prejudice in order to determine whether counsel was ineffective,
201 The primary difference between the two approaches is, of course, the requirement
under the prejudicial incompetence approach that overall incompetence be shown before
specific prejudice will be analyzed. Despite this difference, the two approaches produce simi-
lar results in most cases. These similar results occur in part because counsel who commits
outcome-determinative error is often also incompetent overall, and in part because, in prac-
tice, where there is outcome-determinative error, courts will ignore the inquiry into compe-
tence, or, what is much the same thing, redefine incompetence so that a single critical error
will constitute incompetence. See, e.g., People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464, 386 P.2d 487,
490, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1963), overruled, People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 422-23, 590
P.2d 859, 864-65, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737 (1979); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89,
96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974).
202 E.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (plural-
ity); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 188 (2d Cir. 1980) (claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel must be premised on actual, not merely possible, prejudice);
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 218, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
204 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) ("[Mlany of the rights guaranteed
by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against
state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
205 United States v. Attimirano, 633 F.2d 147, 159 (9th Cir. 1981).
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thereby reading the sixth amendment in light of the fair trial guar-
antee's concern with the substantive accuracy of trial. 08 So viewed,
the present comment's approach is in large part simply an analyti-
cal clarification of the current practice of most courts.
B. The Appointment of Counsel
When it appoints counsel, the trial court in effect exercises the
indigent defendant's right to choose counsel.20 7 From this practice
comes the duty to appoint counsel who reasonably appears capa-
ble, ex ante, of performing competently at trial.208 Trial courts
should, therefore, seek to appoint counsel with due regard for the
factors a defendant would consider in choosing counsel. This view
does not imply a duty to appoint the individual lawyer the defen-
dant would choose; were that true, the court's obligation would be
reduced to formally appointing the individual lawyer chosen by the
defendant. However, all defendants surely seek a lawyer who satis-
fies at least three minimum criteria: first, a reputation for compe-
tent performance; second, prior experience with criminal law and
with the type of case involved; and third, time to prepare and pre-
sent an adequate defense. Therefore, in appointing counsel for in-
digent defendants, a court should seek an attorney who satisfies
these criteria.0 9
2" See, e.g., Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979); United States ex rel.
Lee v. Rowe, 446 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 336 Mass. 89,
96, 315 N.E. 2d 878, 883 (1974); Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 469 Pa. 241, 248-51, 364 A.2d
1359, 1362-64 (1976); see also supra note 69.
20 See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
208 See id.
Courts applying the presumption of attorney competence, see supra notes 185-87
and accompanying text, have sometimes considered this reasoning at least partly persuasive.
Some courts allow the presumption to be overcome, or at least weakened, by a showing that
counsel was inexperienced or had a poor reputation. See, e.g., Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.
2d 400, 402-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 176); Ex parte Harris, 596 S.W.2d 893, 894 & n.3 (Tex
Crim. App. 1980); State v. Jury, 19 Wash. App. 256, 260, 264, 576 P.2d 1302, 1305, 1307
(1978). The courts have been more reluctant to take into account a showing that counsel
had inadequate time to prepare a defense. See, e.g., White v. United States, 358 A.2d 645,
647 (D.C. 1976); Cox v. State, 572 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). But see United
States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982) (appointed counsel with virtually no experi-
ence given only 25 days to prepare defense to complex case found ineffective), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983). This reluctance may be partly explained by the difficulty of deciding
how much time counsel needs to spend and how much a lack of preparation time hinders
the defense. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 84 Mich. App. 1, 6-8, 269 N.W.2d 322, 324-25
(1978); Commonwealth v. Harper, 233 Pa. Super. 294, 299, 334 A.2d 761, 763 (1975). It can
also be explained by the perception that many retained attorneys spend less time on cases
than they would regard as optimal, whether because of other work or of limits on their
clients' ability to pay.
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The following steps are recommended as the procedures to be
followed for a valid appointment of counsel: at a minimum, trial
courts should be required to support their choice of counsel with
written findings as to counsel's reputation, the extent of counsel's
applicable experience, and counsel's workload at the time of ap-
pointment. 10 Such a requirement provides a record for review
without substantially confining or intruding upon the exercise of
the trial court's discretion.211
Other recommendations concerning the duty to appoint must
be made more tentatively, because they are more intrusive on the
trial court's time and discretion. Prior to appointing counsel, the
trial court should review relevant background materials, such as
records of preliminary hearings, indictments and arraignments,
and, if necessary, confer with the prosecution about the complexity
of the case it will present. On the basis of such a review, the trial
court should make a written estimate of the minimum time neces-
sary to investigate the facts and prepare the defense. 212 Similarly,
These reasons counsel caution rather than complete abstention from interference. Most
judges agree that the incidence of attorney incompetence is cause for alarm. See Schwarzer,
supra note 102, at 633-35. Furthermore, most agree that incompetent performance is fre-
quently the result, not of lack of ability or motivation, but of overwork and undercompensa-
tion. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 264 & n.3, 280 n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
210 Perhaps, like Judge Schwarzer's guidelines, see Schwarzer, supra note 102, at 651-65;
see also supra note 108, some of these proposals should be tried in practice rather than
being constitutionalized. At a minimum, however, the trial court should be required to re-
cord the actions it takes in appointing counsel, and to direct its attention to the ex ante
conditions that help ensure competent performance. This proposal simply requires courts to
furnish the basis for a reviewing court to judge whether counsel was appointed with the due
regard for the defendant's rights required by the sixth amendment.
By increasing the likelihood that counsel who is competent ex ante will be appointed,
these proposals will alleviate some of the perceived inequality that has motivated propo-
nents of the abstract competence approach. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d
196, 264-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting.); Schwarzer, supra note 102,
at 635. It would be disingenuous to maintain that concern with minimal conditions of equal-
ity lies wholly outside the purview of Zerbst and Gideon. However, requiring the states to
guarantee the competence of counsel unconditionally to indigent and non-indigent alike
places an intolerable burden on a system whose capacities are already overtaxed. On the
other hand, leaving the protection of the rights of indigent defendants to the largely unre-
viewed and unreviewable discretion of trial courts improperly restricts the meaning of the
trial court's duty to appoint counsel. These proposals find a middle ground.
211 Requiring that reasons be given for official conduct that touches upon individual
rights is a familiar facet of due process law. E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
(state must preserve in the record facts showing that a guilty plea was intelligent and volun-
tary before the plea is acceptable under the due process clause).
212 Cf. Schwarzer, supra note 102, at 651-52 (making similar recommendations). Many
trial courts already take such steps informally. To require that this be done in every case is
not to say that it should be done to the same extent in every case; that judgment lies in the
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trial courts should be required to obtain counsel's agreement that,
despite other work, he can and will spend an amount of time sub-
stantially equivalent to the court's minimum estimate.2 13
The heart of these tentative proposals is the idea that certain
conditions, primarily time, experience, and prior performance,
serve as fairly reliable predictors of competent performance.21 4 By
discretion of the trial court. The trial court should, however, be required to record the steps
it takes and the estimate it forms. The difficulty inherent in estimating the minimum time
necessary to review a case and prepare a defense militates against any attempt to hold trial
courts to an exacting standard of review. It should be emphasized that this estimate repre-
sents a minimum only, not an optimum. However, patently unreasonable estimates would
require a new trial unless the state could show that counsel in fact adhered to what would
have been a reasonable minimum estimate. Since the majority of criminal defendants enter
pleas rather than stand trial, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1969), the
trial court should perhaps also be required to form a minimum estimate of the time counsel
needs to evaluate the defendant's position and advise him as to the prudence of a guilty
plea.
'I. Because the estimate to be made by the trial court is of the minimum time necessary
to represent the defendant adequately, see supra text accompanying note 212, it is likely
that, even without this procedure, many attorneys would protest their appointment were
they too busy to spend the time the estimate requires. Some attorneys undoubtedly seek
appointment in criminal cases, despite low rates of pay, because payment by the court is
guaranteed, although the amount of payment may lie within the court's discretion. For these
attorneys, the proposals made here would seem, on balance, at least as attractive as the
status quo. Although the attorney may not be able to "process" as many cases as he cur-
rently can, his minimum compensation will, in effect, be agreed upon in advance. Finally, it
is within the power of trial courts to expand the pool of available attorneys by requiring
more service as a condition of practice before the court. Therefore, this requirement is un-
likely to create a critical shortage of appointable attorneys, although it may make it margin-
ally more difficult for trial courts to deal with overcrowded dockets. The principal effect of
requiring such an agreement will be to put attorneys on notice of the court's minimum
expectations, and to condition appointment on an agreement to meet those expectations.
There should be no rule requiring a specific method for trial courts to monitor counsel's
compliance with this agreed-upon estimate. Trial courts should retain discretion over when
and whether to inquire into the extent of counsel's preparations. In most cases the attor-
ney's ordinary appearances before the court will confirm his compliance. The threat of pun-
ishment for contempt in cases of gross breach by counsel of his commitment to the trial
court should ensure that counsel will bring problems such as changed circumstances to the
trial court's attention. The trial court's discretion as to continuances or appointment of sub-
stitute counsel should remain undisturbed.
2" The Supreme Court's cases dealing with "effective appointment," e.g., Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), and the right to "effective assistance of cousel," e.g., United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1976), provide considerable support for attempting to
remove the impediments to competent representation by advance appraisal, rather than re-
lying on a retrospective assessment of "competence." Indeed, the proposals made here are
primarily an outgrowth of the two aspects of the appointment in Powell found to violate the
defendants' rights: the lack of any required commitment upon the part of some specific
attorney and the need for adequate time to prepare a defense. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 56,
58. These proposals do go beyond Powell; they specify minimum steps that trial courts must
take to insure that counsel will utilize the opportunity to prepare and accept the responsi-
bility to defend. The basis for this extension of Powell and its progeny is the duty that trial
courts have to appoint competent counsel, and the fact that some trial courts have dis-
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requiring trial courts to focus on these conditions in appointing
counsel, some reduction in the incidence of ineffective representa-
tion can be anticipated. Though defendants receive no guarantee
that counsel will in fact represent them according to a specific
standard of competence,21 5 the trial court's adherence to the condi-
tions proposed here should appreciably increase the likelihood that
counsel will perform competently.
C. Collateral Attack: Effects of the Modified Fair Trial Guaran-
tee Approach on Review in Federal Courts
This comment has argued that a defendant is entitled to a
new trial whenever he shows that counsel's acts or omissions, even
if reasonable, are likely to have caused outcome-determinative
prejudice to his defense. The immediate effect of this proposal on a
defendant's post-conviction remedies, when compared to the tests
charged that duty perfunctorily. Indeed, the presumption that counsel is competent gives
trial courts no incentive to take due care, because failure to do so is not treated as a viola-
tion of the sixth amendment except in extreme cases.
Moreover, the recommendations made here are not inconsistent with the rejection of
per se rules in the untimely-appointment context announced in Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970). The Chambers Court declined to require a minimum time between appoint-
ment and trial, and rejected automatic reversal for untimely appointment. Id. at 53-54. No
such per se rules are proposed here. Certain procedures are required of trial courts, but
discretion and flexibility remain. Similarly, reversal for violation of these proposals is justi-
fied only where the trial court's time estimate was plainly unreasonable, counsel in fact fell
short of a reasonable minimum estimate, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has been willing to specify the duties of trial courts in
other contexts, such as conflicts of interest. Thus, it has held that where the trial court has
been advised of a likely conflict of interest, it must investigate this threat to the defendant
or appoint substitute counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978). The reasons
for specifying such a duty are similar to those relating to appointment of counsel and sup-
port these proposals by analogy. Conflicts of interest, like factors causing incompetence, are
readily identifiable ex ante but tend to produce effects which may be pervasive and difficult
to assess ex post. See id. at 485-86. Rules which prevent such problems from arising in the
first place are appropriate, although it remains inevitable that some problems will still oc-
cur. The difficult judgment of whether errors by counsel actually produced prejudicial ef-
fects will be made after trial under the fair trial guarantee.
215 Defendants will not, for example, be entitled to new trials simply because counsel
breached his agreement to meet the appointing court's minimum time estimate. The basis
for a new trial is a breach by the court of its duty to exercise responsibly the power to
appoint counsel. Unless appointment is made under circumstances which do not permit a
legitimate inference that counsel will prove competent in fact, see Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d
667, 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), or unless the trial court is made aware
of counsel's noncompliance, the right to appointment of competent counsel ends when com-
petent counsel is appointed. If the trial court fails to take remedial measures in the face of
evidence of material noncompliance, it fails to protect the defendant's right to insist on
minimum compliance or replacement of counsel. In this instance as well, the basis for a new
trial is a breach by the court, not counsel, of a duty of care.
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currently employed by most courts, is that a defendant need not
attack counsel's competence or effectiveness. It follows that a de-
fendant will obtain a new trial under the due process clause even
where his underlying substantive claim was procedurally defaulted,
without regard to whether or not counsel would be deemed
competent.
This possibility raises a potential conflict with the rule enunci-
ated in Wainwright v. Sykes 16 that defendants must show "cause"
for a procedural default and "actual prejudice" resulting from the
defaulted claim before habeas corpus relief can be obtained from a
federal court.21' At first glance, this comment's approach appears
simply to bypass the cause requirement; by showing likely out-
come-determinative prejudice attributable to counsel's default of
an underlying claim, a defendant can obtain habeas relief without
having to show cause for the default.218
The Sykes decision expressly left the definitions of "cause"
and "actual prejudice" to subsequent case-by-case elaboration." 9
Where a procedural default is solely the result of attorney conduct,
most lower courts have held the "cause" requirement satisfied by a
showing of "constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel," a
standard which, in all but one circuit, requires a showing that
counsel's act was somehow "incompetent. ' 220 The vast majority of
lower court decisions have interpreted "actual prejudice" to re-
quire a showing that it is "reasonably possible" that the asserted
error had a prejudicial effect.221
216 433 U.S. 72 (1977). For a general discussion of this conflict, see Washington v.
Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451
(1983); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 947 (1979); Tague, supra note 3, at 57-67.
217 433 U.S. at 87-91.
211&By rephrasing his claim in incompetent-counsel terms, the defendant transforms it
into the constitutional claim that his counsel was ineffective, a claim that was not defaulted.
21 433 U.S. at 91.
211 See Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1978); Rinehart v.
Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977); Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The
Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 HAsTnas L.J. 1683, 1712 (1979). Goodman and Sallett
note that three circuits utilize the "farce and mockery" standard. Id. at 1713. Decisions
since the publication of their article have changed the standards in some courts, so that now
every circuit but the second requires a showing of some form of "incompetence" as well as a
showing of prejudicial effects from the acts by counsel. See supra notes 27, 83, 122 and
accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., Thomas v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 695, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1979); McDonald v. Es-
telle, 536 F.2d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 533 U.S. 904, reaff'd in relevant part,
564 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramsey v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Bromweil v. Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106, 114, 120 (D. Md. 1977); Goodman & Sallett,
supra note 220, at 1701-03. This definition is also most in accord with the result implied by
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The approach advocated by this comment offers an opportu-
nity to raise a claim procedurally defaulted by counsel without
having to show "cause," but does so only while considerably raising
the showing of prejudice that must be made, from a reasonable
possibility of prejudice to a likelihood of outcome-determinative
prejudice. Rather than bypassing Sykes, then, this comment's pro-
posal gives a defendant with a procedurally defaulted constitu-
tional claim two choices: he can assert the underlying claim and
show incompetence by counsel as well as a reasonable possibility of
prejudice, or he can make the much greater showing of prejudice
attributable to counsel without regard to the reasons for counsel's
default.222 Only in this narrow sense does the proposal made here
bypass the Sykes "cause" requirement.223
Sykes. See 433 U.S. at 91; see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Goodman &
Sallett, supra note 220, at 1701-02.
222 Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (allowing a judicially
implied § 10(b) remedy to coexist alongside an expressly created remedy under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 on the ground that the higher scienter requirement of the § 10(b)
remedy compensated for the absence of other requirements that must be shown to recover
under § 11).
It should be noted that this comment's proposal does not replace the cause requirement
of Sykes; it simply affords a means of raising the same claims in a different context such
that cause need not be shown. Furthermore, the "competency" inquiry required by most
courts to establish cause is, of course, subject to most of the criticisms made of its use to
establish an independent constitutional claim under the sixth amendment. See supra notes
70-80 and accompanying text. However, detailed discussion of the propriety of the use of
competence in the Sykes context is beyond the scope of this comment.
22 A principal concern animating the Court in Sykes was "sandbagging," strategic gam-
bling by attorneys who default constitutional claims in order to insure review in a federal
forum should the defendant be convicted. 433 U.S. at 89. This comment's proposal will not
provide an incentive for such sandbagging. Under the approach advocated here, the defen-
dant must show likely outcqme-determinative prejudice in order to obtain relief for a proce-
durally defaulted claim bas d on ineffective assistance of counsel. By contrast, should coun-
sel not default, defendant must be granted habeas relief unless the state can establish that
such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, by not procedurally defaulting,
counsel shifts the burden of showing prejudice from the defendant to the state and raises
the threshold which the state must meet. It is difficult to conceive of strategic considerations
which would favor default under this comment's proposal. Cf. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 113 & n.12
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that even the lesser penalty of loss of state remedies con-
stitutes a sufficient deterrent); see also L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 86, at 126-29 (Supp.
1983) (arguing that "sandbagging" fears are exaggerated); Comment, supra note 77, passim
(same).
Moreover, where the defendant's claim persuasively impeaches the reliability of his con-
viction, the marginal benefits of deterring strategic default by attorneys surely do not justify
binding the defendant to his attorney's procedural default. Furthermore, society's interest
in finality is balanced by society's interest in attaching great weight to reliability in criminal
cases. Whether phrased in terms of the fair trial guarantee, sufficient deterrence, or society's
interest in reliability, the conclusion is unchanged. As Justice Stevens has remarked, the
overarching standard for habeas corpus review remains one of "fundamental fairness." Rose
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 n.8 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As particularized by the
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A second likely effect of this comment's reading of the fair
trial guarantee is some increase in the number of defendants who
are able to introduce matters outside the record on collateral at-
tack. Many courts currently rely solely on the trial record as the
basis for findings of "incompetence" or of prejudicial effects.2 4 By
contrast, under the analysis this comment proposes, a defendant
can raise a genuine issue going to the reliability of the determina-
tion of his legal guilt by reference to matters outside as well as
within the trial record. 2 5
It it unlikely that this distinction will have more than margi-
nal effects. A great many collateral attack petitions are dismissed
without a hearing, sometimes without even an answer by the re-
spondent.22'6 The proposals made in this comment do not prevent
courts from continuing to exercise their considerable discretion in
determining when a petition is incredible, self-serving, fails to state
a claim, or is impeached by the trial record so as not to deserve
formal proceedings. What this comment's proposals do remove
from the arsenal of screening devices is the use of an assessment of
counsel's competence to bar claims that plausibly affect the relia-
bility of the verdict.
CONCLUSION
The need for an authoritative standard for review of incompe-
tent counsel claims is imperative. The absence of uniformity in the
way courts resolve the constitutional questions these claims pre-
sent is but a part of the problem. Because incompetent counsel
claims can also serve as a "second bite at the apple" for virtually
all other claims, the treatment of incompetent counsel claims will
affect state procedural rules, the prejudice requirements for rever-
sal on grounds of non-constitutional trial error, and the treatment
of procedurally defaulted constitutional claims by federal habeas
courts.
This comment has proposed that incompetent counsel claims
fair trial guarantee, that standard requires habeas relief when counsel's failure, even if rea-
sonable, to raise a claim gives rise to a legitimate doubt about the defendant's guilt Cf.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L.
Rlv. 142 & passim (1970) (urging that habeas relief be conditioned upon a "colorable show-
ing of innocence").
22' See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
225 Some state courts have already relaxed the barriers to appellate or collateral review
of matters outside the record in incompetent counsel claims. See, e.g., People v. Pope, 223
Cal. 3d 412, 426, 590 P.2d 859, 867, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 740 (1979).
26 See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, §§ 112, 117.
1983] 1429
1430 The University of Chicago Law Review [50:1380
merit new trials upon a showing that counsel's acts or omissions
are likely to have affected the defendant's legal guilt, without a
prerequisite showing of incompetence or ineffectiveness. This ap-
proach respects state procedural rules and prejudice requirements
while affording relief to defendants convicted where reasonable
doubt as to guilt remains.
Trial courts are not constitutionally obliged to supervise de-
fense attorneys, nor is the state obliged to guarantee all defendants
that counsel will prove competent in fact. But trial courts are con-
stitutionally obliged to select appointed counsel with due care for
the rights of indigent defendants. This duty should, at a minimum,
require trial courts to record the steps taken in selecting counsel,
and to determine that counsel's reputation, experience, and work-
load are consistent with a reasoned judgment, as of the time of
appointment, that he will competently represent the defendant.
Stephen G. Gilles
